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The dissertation set out to explore whether privatization
led to the concentration of shares of privatized public
enterprises in the hands of a few. To reach this objective
three indicators were developed. The three indicators were:
(1) the prominence of the stock market; (2) the prominence of
the employees’ ownership shares of the privatized Public
Enterprises (PEs); and (3) the prominence of the state’s
ownership after privatization. Although, the researcher found
that there was a concentration of PE5’ shares in the hands of
a mutual fund and holding company, the presence of the state
remained strong.
The researcher also found that it was extremely difficult
to conduct research regarding the concentration of economic
resources in developing countries. In effect the systemic,
methodological, and contextual difficulties that the
researcher encountered in field work, data collection, data
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review and data analysis revealed that it was difficult to
find out the organization or individual behind the
transactions that have been undertaken during the
privatization process. This limited greatly the significance
of the study. The result is the dissertation was re—oriented
to the theoretical and to the researcher’s normative discourse
on equity and development in privatization.
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In developing countries, privatization is a part of the
institutional reforms to remove inefficiencies and ensure
adequate growth rates. However, is tackling efficiency
without addressing the issue of equity in the best interest
of the developing world? It seems that privatization could
be an opportunity toward reducing the inequity existing in
developing countries. In fact, there is new evidence
pointing to the fact that the issue of efficiency should be
undertaken with equity.
Nevertheless, stabilization and microeconomic
institutional reforms represent the prevailing orthodoxy in
the adjustment lending of the World Bank (WB) and
International Monetary Fund (IMF).’ The WB and IMF are the
main international organizations that provided the stimulus
‘Dani Rodrik, “How Should Structural Adjustment




toward privatization in developing countries.2 In effect,
since the 1980s, these two institutions have emphasized
privatization in their lending programs.3 The WB and the IMF
deem privatization as necessary corollary in catalyzing the
reduction of deficit financing underpinning the mainstay of
Public Enterprises (PEs) in developing countries. These
institutions, the WB and the IMF, contend that privatization
is a precondition for broadening the equity building
structure of developing countries. However, what if the tool
of privatization does not broaden ownership? What if it
exacerbates the concentration of economic resources in the
hands of a few? This is one of the crucial questions that
developing countries face as they move forward with
privatization. Privatization can be a tool to reinforce the
economic system, thus decreasing the participation of the
population in the affairs of the country. This in turn may
run counter to the original intent behind privatization that
is to bring to the fold a large popular base engaged in the
economic system.
2Don Babai, “The World Bank and the IMF: Rolling Back
the State or Backing its Role?” in The Promise of
Privatization: A Challenge for U.S. Policy, ed. Raymond




In addition, as stated earlier, new evidence shows that
the issues of equity and efficiency are linked.
This indicates that the issue of equity could be tackled
while privatizing. This in turn would not only accelerate
the democratization process but also contribute to the
reduction of inequality thus stimulating growth. The link
between inequality and growth is addressed in chapter two.
The ultimate goal of making public enterprises more
efficient is to stimulate growth. Nevertheless, if the
privatization of PE5 leads to the concentration of economic
resources in the hands of a few, it will exacerbate the
inequality already existing in developing countries. This
will not help developing countries (or the world for that
matter) address the crucial problem of inequality that is a
prevailing international dilemma.
Thus, studying the redistribution of assets of PEs in
developing countries will point out the consequences of
initiating privatization without regard to equity. As Hoyer
recognizes, in most developing countries, local elites have
replaced colonial authorities and frequently they have
neglected the needs of most of the population.4
4Hans J. Hoyer, Open Minds: Reflections on Human
Development and South-North Issues (Colornbo, Sri Lanka:
Regional Office of South Asia (ROSA), Plan International,
1996), 25.
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As such, this study will use the case of Côte d’Ivoire to
analyze the privatization redistribution of assets of PEs in
developing countries. Nine privatized PEs, from 1994 to
1995, have been selected with a view to examining whether
privatization led to a greater concentration of resources in
the hands of few institutions and organizations or whether
it led to the broadening of equity building structures, a
vital sign of greater popular participation in the national
economy.
1. Statement of the Problem
Dinavo, Holden and Rajapatirana, Cook and Kirkpatrick,
and Waters accept the idea that privatization brings
efficiency in Public Enterprises (PE5) . However, other
authors in the field do not. Among them are Abramovitz,
Sullivan, Kolderie, Vernon, Danso, Adam and Hanke. They have
analyzed privatization in developed and developing countries
and reached different conclusions. These authors point out
that privatization is most successful when factors such as
equity, adequacy of human resources, institutions, and the
social and public character of privatization are
incorporated in the analysis.
Although developing countries are implementing the
privatization program under the directive of the World Bank
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and International Monetary Fund, it is not certain that
privatization will benefit the majority of the population in
these countries. Given the existing concentration of
economic resources in most developing countries, this study
attempts to reveal whether privatization broadens ownership
or wether it does not exacerbate the concentration of
resources in the hands of a few.
2. Objective of the Study
The proponents of privatization emphasize the
efficiency aspect of privatization. The opponents of
privatization stress the necessity to incorporate in the
analysis other factors such as: equity, readiness of the
human resources, and adequacy of the institutions in the
country implementing privatization. One should bear in mind
that the latter side of privatization is related to the
broader context in which privatization is implemented.
Though the topic under consideration has generated a
substantial amount of literature, there have been few
attempts to examine the privatization redistribution of
assets of public enterprises in developing countries. The
study that closely addresses this issue, the broadening of
local participation in privatization of public assets in
Africa, was written by Dawit Makonnen. This paper discusses
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the reasons why countries in Africa are having trouble in
broadening public participation by privatizing their public
enterprises and it follows by offering recommendations to
alleviate these obstacles. It indicates the necessity for
government to make privatization’s transactions more
transparent.5 It also points out that there is a need to
disseminate the information to the population at large to
involve them.6 The author argues that the development of the
stock market should be viewed as the easiest way to reach
the majority of the people while privatizing. Finally, he
recommends replicating ‘best practices’ by directing group
ownership as a scheme to the broadening of equity building
structures.7 Although Makonnen deals with the need to better
the approach of broadening privatized public assets, he does
not address the fact that privatization could lead to the
concentration of public assets in the hands of a few in
developing countries. This neglected area of privatization
is tackled in this study.
5Dawit Makonnen, “Broadening Local Participation in






3. Formulation of Hypothesis
Privatization was conceived by its proponents to bring
efficiency in PEs. However, this researcher points out that
the skeptics of privatization remain cautious allowing the
possibility that privatization may exacerbate the
concentration of resources in the hands of a few
institutions or organizations in developing countries. If
this is the case, developing countries have a major hurdle
to overcome. This is what the researcher intends to expose
in this exploratory work.
4. Research Design
a. Research Ouestions
The researcher will explore the following questions in
the dissertation.
1) What is the percentage of shares owned by the state
before and after privatization of PE5?
2) What is the percentage of shares directed to the stock
market as well as other organizations and institutions after
privatization?
3) Have the firms that already owned shares in PEs increased
their ownership during privatization?
4) What are the PEs’ shares value before and after
privatization?
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5) What is the percentage acquisition of shares in each
privatized enterprises by the personnel?
6) Does privatization make it easier for certain
institutions or organizations to acquire more shares than
others?
b. Definitions of terms
The redistribution of assets, in this study, refers to
the transfer of public ownership (or public management) to
private ownership (or private management) . Assets can be
valued by the price of shares. The terms redistribution and
transfer are used in this work interchangeably.
Personnel are employees of companies privatized or not.
Economic resources are the shares that the state owns in PE5
and privatized PEs. Efficiency in this study refers to the
managers’ utilization of assets of PE5 to create profit
rather than deficits.
c. Methodology
This dissertation uses an exploratory approach to the
research questions posted earlier. It uses an
interdisciplinary focus to analyze the patterns to be found
in the case study of privatization programs in Côte
d’Ivoire. Nine privatized PE5 from 1994 to 1995 (of the
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twenty one privatized PEs between 1990 and 1995)are
analyzed.
In short, the goal of this work is simple: explore if
privatization led to a broadening of ownership of public
enterprises. To this end, thirteen tables were developed
from which two major tables (tables 14 and 15) resulted.
These two final tables identify the total value of each
organization that participated in the privatization process
through shares acquisition. The tables also identify the
percentage of total value of shares of privatized PE5 owned
by each organization. A word or two could prove useful here
with regard to the rest of the tables if only to
contextualize the data in tables fourteen and fifteen.
Tables one to nine present data on the transference of the
state’s shares to the private sector. Table ten provides the
contribution of PEs in the Gross Domestic Product(GDP)of
Côte d’Ivoire, before and after privatization. This by
definition allows one to gauge heuristically whether
privatization has significantly affected the privatized PE5
contribution to the economy of the country. Table eleven
gives the breakdown of the state’s shares value in PE5
before and after the arrival of privatization. The table
also provides data on the state’s contribution in the GDP,
before and after privatization. Table twelve shows the
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details of both the shares value owned by state and non
state actors in the PEs after privatization and the GDP
contribution by non state actors. Table eleven and table
twelve display data for comparative purposes to show the
amount of the state’s assets transfer to the private sector.
Table thirteen lays out the surnmative data on state and non
state actors involved in several privatized PEs. To
demonstrate that there is a concentration or not of economic
resources the researcher developed tables fourteen and
fifteen. Table fourteen shows the value of shares owned by
the state and organizations after privatization; table
fifteen not only classifies the public enterprises by their
shares’ value but also identifies the shareholders by
ascending order of their percentage value of shares after
privatization.
d. Key Indicators
Although this dissertation is exploratory in nature,
the key instruments of measurement are useful in gauging
public participation, or the broadening of ownership of
assets of public enterprises and thus addressing in a way
issues of distributive justice, are the following: 1) The
prominence of the stock market during the privatization
process indicated by the value and percentage of the stock
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market in the total value of the shares of the privatized
PEs. This reveals how much small investors have been
participating in the implementation of the privatization
program. 2) The importance of the stocks owned by the
employees of the privatized PEs reveals how privatization
allowed the involvement of the personnel of the companies
that did not own any shares before privatization. The
employees’ involvement in the privatized PE5 is important
because it indicates the state’s efforts to involve
individuals without large capital in the privatization
process; which is a basis for broadening assets’ ownership.
3) The percentage of shares owned by the state after
privatization. This indicator allows one to examine if the
state is still strongly present in the economy or if it has
significantly withdrawn. This is stated based strictly on
the statistics presented because strong ties between members
of the government and individuals or organizations buying
shares of the privatized PE5 may exist. This being the case,
it could facilitate the ownership of shares by certain
groups. From that perspective, one can argue that this is
not private ownership but just a reshuffling of the state’s
shares.
In short, to know if the broadening of equity building
structure is taking place in a country, one has to assess if
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the state has significantly withdrawn from the economy
(though as indicated above this can be tricky to assess
sometimes), and that the withdrawal is mostly beneficial to
small investors and employees of privatized PE5.
e. .l1imitation of the study
The major limitation in this dissertation has been in
the gathering of data to reach the objective that was to
point out whether or not a concentration of economic
resources took place during privatization from 1994 to 1995.
In effect, difficulty has arisen when trying to find data
because it was not readily available in the United States.
In addition, access to such information was only available
through the office in charge of the privatization program in
Côte d’Ivoire. Another hurdle has been in identifying
individual shareholders of mutual fund and holding company
and investors that have bought some shares of privatized
Public Enterprises (PEs). Such information is not public;
thus one can only approximate the facts concerning the
broadening of ownership of assets of PE5. For instance, the
analysis conducted in this dissertation merely allows the
highlighting of organizations owning the shares of
privatized PE5. Further, when trying to identify individuals
behind such ownership, additional obstacles surfaced making
13
a significant analysis concerning the influence of certain
companies or certain individuals well nigh impossible
without access to sensitive information. This data was
concerning the transactions or acquisitions made by all the
organizations and individuals that have participated in the
privatization program. This information would have shown how
certain organization or individuals influence certain
industries or sectors by their ownership. Records that exist
on such transactions are not public and therefore are not
available. The complexity in identifying individual owners
of shares and the difficulty to know in certain instances if
companies have not been taking part in purchase of shares of
the privatized Public Enterprises make it severely difficult
to point out the individuals and organizations that have
benefitted from privatization due to their social
affiliation or political connections.
As indicated the major limitation in this dissertation has
been in the gathering of data to indicate whether or not a
concentration of economic resources took place during
privatization from 1994 to 1995. One has to note here that the
difficulties pertain mostly to the characteristics of the stock
market of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire. In effect, the capital market
in Côte d’Ivoire is not as well developed as those of the
developed countries. The capital market in Côte d’Ivoire
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is characterized by the existence of banks that act as
intermediaries between investors and the stock market. The
banks that are making most of the transactions on the stock
market are the following: Banque Internationale pour
l’Afrique de l’Ouest-Côte d’Ivoire (BIAO—CI), Banque
internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de Côte
d’Ivoire (BICICI), CITIBANK, ECOBANK, Société Ivoirienne de
Banque (SIB). One must also note that information regarding
the identities of Ivorian companies buying shares is not
readily available as it is in the United States and other
developed countries. In addition, stock market transactions
can only be done through banks or people called “Apporteur
d’affaires.” These institutions act as brokers for citizens
or organizations attempting to buy shares. However, the
“Apporteur d’affaires” are organizations that act on behalf
of the bank to recruit clients and also are centers of
information for the daily activities of the stock market.
The institutions that do the transactions on the stock
market are the banks, as the researcher indicated earlier.
These institutions are buying and selling the shares on
behalf of their clients. Their clients are either companies
or individual investors.
The banks cited earlier are the ones that have all the
information concerning the transactions that their
15
clients have performed on the stock market. Access to this
information would have led to the discovery of the major
actors in the buying and selling of the shares on the stock
market or in private, and the identification of the
organizations or individuals that owned most of the shares
of privatized public enterprises. Such discoveries and
identifications would have given out a clear indication of
whether the concentration of the economic resources is in
the hands of a few, or not. However, the banks regard the
information of their clients as private and only accessible
to the organizations or individuals concerned. These facts
severely impaired the original objective of this study and
placed additional limitation on its analysis.
The information thus gathered allow the study only to
indicate a trend but not to point out with certainty where
and how the concentration of economic resources was taking
place and who the major actors of that phenomena were. Then
indications and highlights are presented in section 7 of
chapter 1. The end result of all this is that the
dissertation’s major focus concentrates on reviewing the
broader literature on the significance of taking into
account equity in the process of privatization in developing
countries.
16
Despite the limitations mentioned, this collection of
data is significant since it sheds light on what could take
place after the implementation of privatization in
developing countries when other criteria (such as equity)
besides efficiency are not taken into account when
privatizing Public Enterprises. It also points out the major
difficulty encountered when trying to analyze the
concentration of shares of the privatized PE5.
5. Organization of the Study
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One
comprises the Introduction, the Statement of the Problem,
Objective of the Study, Formulation of Hypothesis, Research
Design, the Organization of the Study and the Case Study.
Chapter Two introduces the Contextualization of
Privatization. It includes the Context and Motives of
Privatization in Developed Countries, and the Context and
Motives of Privatization in Developing Countries. Chapter
Three concerns the Literature Review, and it encompasses the
Privatization Debate. Chapter Four elaborates on the Content
of Privatization. It discusses the Definition of
Privatization, its Constraints, and its different Forms.
Chapter Five is the Methodology, and it is composed of the
Valuation of Privatized PEs, and the Analysis. Chapter Six
17




La République de Côte d’Ivoire, formally known as the
Ivory Coast, gained independence from France on August 7,
1960.8 It is located in West Africa (see map of Côte
d’Ivoire, page 18). The territory covers 322,463 square
kilometers. The capital city is Abidjan and the official
language is French. As of 1995, the population was
14,300, QQQ~9 The gross national product was CFAF 7.1
billion in 1994, with a gross national product per
inhabitant of $510 in 1994.’° The local currency is the CFA
franc and the exchange rate was $1 for CFAF 500 in 1995.”
8Lambert Kouassi, “36 Ans d’Indépendance de la
COte d’Ivoire,” Fraternité Matin, 6 — 7 AoQt 1996, p. 2.
9~Côte d’Ivoire,” Jeune Afric~ue, no. 1843—1844 (1—
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The gross domestic product by sectors is as follows: 41
percent agriculture, 33 percent services, and 26 percent
industry. 12
The principal rivers are the Bandama and Comoé. They
are respectively 950 km, and 900 km long.’3 The principal
cities are Abidjan, Bouaké, and Yamoussokro with 1994
populations of 1.085 million, 220,000, and 120,000
respectively.
In 1995, 56 percent of the population was rural and 44
percent was urban. The religious demographics of the
population during that same period were 65 percent Animist,
23 percent Muslim, and 12 percent Catholic.
The president is democratically elected for five years.
The current president is Gbagbo Laurent who took power after
the election of October, 2000. The legislative power is made
up of the National Assembly where members are elected for
five year terms.
The average life expectancy is fifty years, with an
infant mortality rate of ninety two deaths per one thousand
deliveries.’4 Like many countries in Africa, Côte d’Ivoire’s





regard for the pre—existing ethnic boundaries.15 Today, Côte
d’Ivoire has sixty ethnic groups subdivided into four larger
groupings. Each of these grouping is united by a common
ancestry. Thus, the pre—colonial territories of the Akan of
southeast Câte d’Ivoire extend to modern day Ghana. The
Krous people, in the southwest, extend westward into Guinea.
The Mandé people of the northwest spread northward into
Mali. The Voltaic people of the northeast have strong ties
in Burkina Faso and northern Ghana.’6
Câte d’Ivoire, formally known as Ivory Coast, got its
latter name from the Europeans because large elephant herds
were roaming the area when they~ The French did
not colonize Côte d’Ivoire to take advantage of the wealth
of natural resources there. They colonized the area because
they wanted to stop the British from expanding westward.’8
The political history of Côte d’Ivoire has been
dominated by planters (such as Houphouet Boigny, Joseph
Anoma, Georges Kassi, Amadou Touré, Djibril Diaby, Gabriel
Dadié, and Florence Brou) because during the colonization
15John Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism: African
Entrepreneurs in Côte d’Ivoire (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne





period, Câte d’Ivoire was designated as a supplier of cash
crops for the French market.’9 This has significantly
influenced the economic structure of Côte d’Ivoire until the
present time.
b. Economic background of Côte d’Ivoire
At independence, the economy of Côte d’Ivoire was based
on two products: coffee and cocoa.2° The annual growth of 7
percent during the first twenty years of independence could
be matched by few countries, developed or developing.2’
Nevertheless, the decreasing price of coffee and cocoa in
1980—1981 led the country to an economic crisis.22
Consequently, the income per inhabitant decreased by 25
percent during the second half of the 1980s; this led to a
decline in national saving and investment.23
In 1989 the budget deficit reached 17 percent of Gross
‘9lbid., 18.
20lntervention de Lucas Danho, Vice President du
Comité de Privatization et Coordinator de la Callously
Technique (Cabinet du Premier Minister), PRIVPAS, KH 2 Mai
1995, 2.
21Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, Ivory Coast: The Challenge
for Success (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978), 3.
22Présentation du Programme de Privatization du
Gouvernement de Côte d’Ivoire (Novembre 1992), 2.
23Ibid.
22
Domestic Product (GDP) while the deficit in the balance of
payments was equivalent to 10 percent of GDP.24
Although the world prices of agricultural products
declined again in the 1990s, the stabilizing program
implemented by the government helped decrease its expenses
by reducing its budget deficit.25 For instance, non salary
expenses have been reduced from CFAF 261 billion in 1989 to
CFAF 182 billion in 1991. The economic crisis reveals the
structural weaknesses of the Ivoirien economy.
The Ivoirien economy relied heavily on the export of
two raw agricultural products: coffee and cocoa. These two
commodities were generating most of the export income that
was equivalent to 40 percent of the value of the total
exports. The country was heavily dependent on the
importation of basic products like rice and private
investments to shore up Ivoirien productivity.
The industrial sector was not competitive at the
national or the international level. The state was financing
the deficit of public enterprises to ensure their solvency.
In addition, the lack of liquidity in the banking system and
capital market did not support the expanding economy and




difficulties were aggravated by the cumbersome regulations
prohibiting companies from being flexible enough to adapt
quickly to changes taking place in the economic environment.
The 3.8 percent growth of the population increased the
demand for products while the heavy external debt was
severely limiting the stabilization effort. Although some
measures of stabilization were adopted in the 1980s, they
were not comprehensive enough to strengthen the structural
difficulties described earlier.26
Thus, the government has been carrying out a more
stringent stabilization program since 1989. Since then, the
government has been concentrating on three structural
adjustment programs: the Agricultural Structural Adjustment
program (ASAP), the Energy Structural Adjustment program
(ESAP), and the Water Structural Adjustment program
(WSAP) 27 These reforms were intended to resolve the
rigidities the economy was suffering from the three sectors
mentioned earlier.
26lnternational Monetary Fund, Côte d’Ivoire: Recent
Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report No. 96/6,
February 1996, 1.
27Republic of COte d’Ivoire: Office of the Prime
Minister, CEPICI, The Economic Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,
May 1995, 2.
24
To this, the IMF country report adds that:
Since 1990, Côte d’Ivoire’s structural reforms
efforts have taken a new turn, aimed at
disengaging the state from productive
activities, improving competitiveness,
alleviating rigidities in certain key
sectors as an engine of growth ... After
a rather slow start, these reforms were
deepened and accelerated after the
adjustment of the parity of the CFA
franc in earlier 1994.28
It was under these circumstances that the privatization
program was implemented. Privatization is one of the major
elements of the medium term stabilization program and
economic growth put in place by the government for the
period 1991_95.29 For the economy of Côte d’Ivoire to
stabilize and regain an accelerated growth rate, the
government based its program of recovery on greater
involvement of the private sector and better utilization of
the country’s resources.3°
281MF Staff Country Report No. 96/6, February 1996,
20.




c. The PEs in Côte d’Ivoire
c.l. Reasons for the Establishment of Public
Enterprises in Côte d’Ivoire
After its independence, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy was
based on two products: coffee and cocoa.3’ The government of
Côte d’Ivoire created public enterprises to compensate for
the lack of those enterprises in the private sector.32 This
diversification was deliberate. According to Danho, it was
intended to reduce the dependence of the country on coffee
and cocoa and to create new products to satisfy the needs of
the population of the post colonial economy.33
The public enterprises constituted the back bone of the
economic development process in Côte d’Ivoire. Their
objectives were to allow the country to control certain
sectors of the economy (public service, banks, etc.) ~
The public enterprises have played an important role in the
development process.
Their objectives were to allow Côte d’Ivoire to control
certain sectors of the economy (public service, banks,
31lntervention de Mr. Lucas Danho, 4.
32”Conseille des Ministres, Enterprises Publiques: des
Goufres a Milliards,” Fraternité Matin, 26 Mai, 1995, p. 2.
33lntervention de Mr. Lucas Danho, 4.
34Ibid.
26
etc.), to diversify and modernize agricultural production,
to exploit the natural resources of the country, to promote
and develop the infrastructure in the energy and transport
sector, to undertake projects requiring long term capital to
promote regional development and to stimulate employment.35
Hence, in 1977 Côte d’Ivoire had 113 enterprises that
employed one third of the working population of the country.
The one hundred thirteen companies were utilizing 27 percent
of the public resources for investments and were the
beneficiary of 40 percent of the state loans.36 The number
of public enterprises increased to one hundred forty in
1982 .~‘
c.2. The Problems of PE5 in Côte d’Ivoire
From 1980-1981 following the decrease of the price of
coffee and cocoa, Côte d’Ivoire started to experience some
economic difficulties. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
decreased to 28 percent between 1985 and 1990.38 The number
of public enterprises went from 140 to 117 between 1982 and
35Présentation du Programme de Privatization du
Gouvernement, 8.




privatized.39 During the period 1982—1988, the net profit of
the public enterprises was evaluated CFAF 39 billion
although the total subsidies from the government amounted to
CFAF 568 billion. One can understand from the previous
analysis the reason why the government of Côte d’Ivoire was
eager to privatize its public enterprises.
In addition, thorough analysis revealed that there were
three kinds of companies the state was involved in:
companies in which the state was the only shareholder, the
state owned 100 percent of the capital; companies in which
the state was a majority shareholder; and companies where
the state was a minority shareholder.4° The analysis showed
that the companies in which the state owned 100 percent of
the capital lost CFAF 85 billion. The companies where the
state was a majority shareholder realized a net cumulative
loss of CFAF 10 billion. Only the companies in which the
state was the minority shareholder realized a cumulated net
profit of CFAF 134 billion.4’
39Ibid.
‘1’°Intervention de Mr. Lucas Danho, 9.
41Ibid., 10.
27
1989 because several public enterprises were sold or
privatized.39 During the period 1982-1988, the net profit of
the public enterprises was evaluated CFAF 39 billion
although the total subsidies from the government amounted to
CFAF 568 billion. One can understand from the previous
analysis the reason why the government of Côte d’Ivoire was
eager to privatize its public enterprises.
In addition, thorough analysis revealed that there were
three kinds of companies the state was involved in:
companies in which the state was the only shareholder, the
state owned 100 percent of the capital; companies in which
the state was a majority shareholder; and companies where
the state was a minority shareholder.4° The analysis showed
that the companies in which the state owned 100 percent of
the capital lost CFAF 85 billion. The companies where the
state was a majority shareholder realized a net cumulative
loss of CFAF 10 billion. Only the companies in which the
state was the minority shareholder realized a cumulated net
profit of CFAF 134 billion.41
39Ibid.
40lntervention de Mr. Lucas Danho, 9.
41Ibid., 10.
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Furthermore, although the state received the most subsidies
in the subsector in which it was the only shareholder it was
in that subsector that it earned the less money. From this
subsector, during the period 1982—1988, the state collected
CFAF 31 billion in taxes. While in the companies where the
state was the minority shareholder, it collected CFAF 213
billion in taxes. Therefore, the more shares the state owned
in the public enterprise, the poorer the company did
financially and economically.42 The bad performance by the
public enterprises was due to the lack of good management,
the low level of productivity, the weaknesses or the lack of
effective mechanisms of control in the company and excessive
regulation.43 Thus, giving the financial constraints that






c.3. Privatization: its objectives
The government of Côte d’Ivoire saw privatization as
vital for several reasons. One major reason was to improve
productivity and competitiveness of PEs by making their
operations efficient.45 The other reasons were to increase
the number of job opportunities in the country through the
influx of technical and financial resources; to reduce the
cost of PEs to increase their market share;” and to
increase the saving of the country by selling shares of
privatized PEs to the population at large through the stock
market.47 In turn, the proceeds of the sale of the state’s
shares could be transferred to traditional activities such
as national education, health, social programs, and
infrastructures.48 In other words, the efficiency of PE5
will be contributing to the growth process of Côte d’Ivoire.
However, as stated previously, PE5’ efficiency in
developing countries should be tackled by paying attention
to the issue of equity in developing countries. Where does
the Côte d’Ivoire stand on this issue?






According to Lambert Schneider and Suwa, inequality is high
in Côte d’Ivoire.49 They state that the gini coefficients
(which measures the disparity of income in a country) for
income distribution during the 1970s were estimated at
between 52 percent and 54 percent.5° In addition, regional
inequality seems even more pronounced within regions.5’ For
instance, 5 percent of the population lives below the
poverty line of CFAF 96,560 in Abidjan, while 60 percent
fall below that line in the savannah.52
Another analysis made by the IMF found that despite the
rapid economic growth experienced in Côte d’Ivoire in the
1960s and 1970s, the income disparities appeared to have
widened.53 In addition, this was evidenced by the rising
gini coefficient and the decline of the lowest quintile in
total income.54 In the 1980s and at the beginning of the
l990s, the proportion of poor households rose from 11
49Sylvie Lambert, Hartmut Schneider, and Akiko Suwa,
“Adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire: 1980—86,” World Development
19, no. 11 (1991) : 1565.
50Ibid.
51Ibid., 1566.
53lnternational Monetary Fund, Côte d’Ivoire: Selected
Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report
No. 98/46, May l998,p. 28.
54Ibid.
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percent in 1985 to 32.2 percent in 1993, while it reached
36.8 percent in 1995.~~ To sum up1 inequality in Côte
d’Ivoire seems not to be influenced by growth. This is the
reason why privatization is an opportunity to integrate the
population at large in the affairs of the country. As the
author pointed out earlier, growth has limitations.
Considering any opportunity that can be useful to alleviate
such limitations is vital. This is why the broadening of
assets of public enterprises in developing countries is an
opportunity not to be missed because developing countries
do not have many opportunities to tackle such an issue.
c.4. Leaal Framework of the Privatization Program in
Côte d’Ivoire
To enforce privatization the government issued a
decree No. 90-1610 on December 28, 1990.56 This decree was
developed to facilitate the transfer of PEs’ public assets
to the private sector, and to set up a structure and system
that would have the responsibility not only of carrying out
the program of privatization (as it is defined in this
dissertation) but also to restructure public enterprises.
55Ibid.
56Journal Officiel de la Re~ublique de Côte
d’Ivoire, 24 Janvier 1991, p. 34.
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The former aspect of privatization allows the government to
transfer its shares from any companies. In addition, it
established the fact that the state is in charge of
realizing all preliminary studies to restructure the
privatized PEs. The latter aspect of the decree stipulates
even further the specific role of the state. It encompasses
the following: (1) define the privatization policy, (2)
select the enterprises to be privatized and restructured,
(3) choose the method and procedure of privatization to be
used, (4) determine the minimum value at which the PE is
transferred to the private sector, and (5) oversee the
privatization program. The Committee on Privatization and
the Technical Unit under the authority and the control of
the Prime Minister were established to implement the
privatization program. Furthermore, the members of this
Committee were appointed by the Prime Minister. To help in
the privatization process the Caisse Nationale
d’Amortissement has been in charge of centralizing all the
shares and participation of the state in the PES. This is
the legal framework that the government of Côte d’Ivoire has
established to execute the privatization program.
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c.5. The PEs privatized in Câte d’Ivoire between 1990
and 1995
Although the case study concerns only the privatization
of PE5 between 1994 and 1995, privatization has begun much
earlier. From 1990 to 1995, 21 companies have been
privatized.
One of the first companies to be privatized was CIE
(Compagnie Ivoirienne d’électricité). Its capital before
privatization amounted to CFAF 10 million and was
distributed as follows: Saur (representing the Bouygues
group) 51 percent, the Ivoirien state 20 percent, the CIE
personnel 5 percent, and private shareholders 24 percent.
During the privatization process, the state sold 480,000 of
its shares at CFAF 5,500 a share. The total value of the
transaction was CFAF 2.64 billion.
In 1991 two companies were privatized. CEIB (Complexe
d’exploitation industrial du bétail de Fer]céssédougou). The
initial capital before privatization was not disclosed.
After privatization, the management of CEIB was transferred
to SEBOVIA, a meat and cattle management company. CEDA
(Centre d’Edition et de Diffusion Africaines) has an initial
capital of CFAF 461 million. The distribution of its capital
was not available. However after privatization the capital
was distributed in the following manner: 27.46 percent
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Ivoirien state, 40 percent Hatier, 9 percent HMH, and 23.54
percent Private. It was indicated that the privates and the
state shares will be transferred at a later period.
In 1992, two other companies were privatized. BINEA
(Office pour les Nouvelles Editions Africaines) , the initial
capital was not available. Though, The privatization process
led to the transfer of the assets of BINEA to the Group
Edicef—CEE for CFAF 590 million. The second company that was
privatized in 1992 was Centres de Récréation Assinie and
Assouindé. Here again, the initial capital was not
disclosed, but the assets of the Centres de Récréation have
been transferred to Club méditerranée for a value of CFAF
1.5 billion.
Four companies were privatized in 1993. CAPRAL-Nestlé
(Compagnie Africaine de Production Alimentaire) had an
initial value of 3.6 billion distributed between Nestlé SA
67.6 percent, Maggi SA 3.1 percent, CSSPA 13.7 percent, and
Privates 13.6 percent. During privatization, the state sold
7 percent of its shares on the stock market for a value of
CFAF 882 million. Cosmivoire was privatized with an initial
value of CFAF 702 million. Before privatization the state
owned 13.2 percent of the initial capital while the privates
owned 86.8 percent.
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During the privatization process, the state sold all its
shares to individuals.
The total value of the transaction was CFAF 186 million.
Novalim—Nestlé was also privatized during that period. It
has an initial capital of CFAF 2.6 billion, and was
distributed as follows: Nestlé SA 79.04 percent, CSSPA 7.8
percent, and Maggi SA 13.16 percent. The state transferred
the total shares of 7.8 percent that it owned by the
intermediary of CSSPA to the Company Capral—Nestlé for a
value of CFAF 567.8 million. Finally, Filtissac (a Bay
spinning mill and weaving company> was privatized with an
initial value of CFAF 2.1 billion. The initial capital was
distributed between Agha Khan Fund for Economic Development
35.81 percent, Ivoirien state 24.41 percent, Industrial
promotion service (IPS) 10 percent and the privates 29.78
percent. During the privatization process the state sold its
shares on the stock market, and the total value of the
transaction was CFAF 903.6 million.
In 1994 five PEs were privatized. SAPH (Société
Africaine de Plantations d’Hévéas) was privatized with an
initial capital of CFAF 13 billion. The initial capital was
distributed as follows; state 55.26 percent, SIPH 35.38
percent, CFD 2.85 percent, CDC 2.85 percent, DEG 2.85
percent, and others 0.81 percent.
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The state during privatization transferred 45.26 percent of
the value of its shares to OCTIDE.
The total value of the transaction was CFAF 5.5 billion.
SICOR (Société Ivoirienne de Coco Râpé) has an initial
capital of CFAF 500 million that was distributed as follows:
Ivoirien state 51 percent, Ivoirien privates 20 percent,
COFINCI 15 percent and BEI (Banque Européenne
d’investissement) 14 percent. When privatizing, the state
sold its shares on the stock market. The total value of the
transaction was CFAF 1.3 billion. SICABLE (Société
Ivoirienne de cables) has an initial capital of CFAF 555
million and was distributed among; the Ivoirien state 35
percent, Pirelli 51 percent, Ivoiral 9 percent, Sidelaf 5
percent. During the privatization process, the state sold
its shares on the stock market. The total value of the
transaction reached CFAF 751.1 million. SICF (Société
Ivoirienne des chemins de fer ) was privatized in 1994 with
an initial capital value of CFAF 3 billion.
It was 100 percent owned by the state. The state transferred
the management of SICF to Sitarail. The Complexe Sucrier de
Maradiassa in which the state owned 100 percent was sold to
Sicafa for the amount of CFAF 800 million.
In 1995 seven companies were privatized. Elf Oil-Cl
(Elf Oil Côte d’Ivoire) was privatized in 1995 with an
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initial capital of CFAF 510 million that was distributed as
follows; fifty percent 50 percent Ivoirien state, 49.96
percent Elf oil Africa, and 0.04 percent privates. After
privatization the state transferred 30 percent of its
capital by selling 16 percent of it on the stock market and
14 percent was sold to Elf Oil Africa. The total value of
the transaction amounted to CFAF 1.27 billion. CAl
Sinematiali (Complexe agro-industriel de Sinematiali) that
the state owned 100 percent was sold to COT for CFAF 250
million. The initial capital was not available. 50GB
(Société de caoutchoucs de Grand Béréby) has an initial
capital of CFAF 21 billion. It was distributed as follows:
Ivoirien state 94.83 percent and Michelin 5.17 percent. The
state transferred 60 percent of its capital after
privatization to Béréby Finance. The total value of the
transaction was CFAF 11 billion. CAl Anguélédougou (Complexe
agro—industriel d’Anguélédougou) that the state owned at
100 percent was privatized. Although the initial capital was
not disclosed, 80 percent of the shares that the state owned
were bought by Saphic-GMG for CFAF 1.6 billion. SMB (Société
multinatjonale de bitumes) has an initial capital of CFAF
1.2 billion. This capital was distributed as follows:
Ivoirien state 91.95 percent, SIR 2.29 percent, Shell—Cl
5.74 percent, and 0.02 percent privates.
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The state transferred 51 percent of its capital to SIR.
The total amount of the transaction was CFAF 2.8 billion.
Shell—Cl (Shell Côte d’Ivoire) has an initial capital of
CFAF 1.8 billion. The state owned 50 percent of this capital
while Shell International owned the other 50 percent. The
state transferred 30 percent of its capital, with 16 percent
sold on the stock market and the other 14 percent to shell
International. The total value of the transaction was valued
at CFAF 1.7 billion. Finally, SIFAL (Société Ivoirienne de
Fabrication de Lubrifiants) had an initial value of CFAF 140
million. The capital was distributed between the Ivoirien
state 30 percent, Shell—Cl 20 percent, Total—Cl 15 percent,
and Mobil-Cl 15 percent. After privatization, the state
transferred 20 percent of its capital. Of the 20 percent
transferred by the state, 2 percent went to the personnel,
13 percent went to Shell-Cl, and 5 percent went to Mobil-Cl.
The total value of the transaction was CFAF 316.4 million.
While the privatization process has started rather
slowly with one company privatized in 1990, it has
accelerated its pace by reaching seven companies privatized
in 1995. This indicates that the privatization committee and
the technical secretariat under the direct supervision of
the Prime Minister’s office has gained experience in
privatizing PE5. According to the previous statement, one
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can clearly understand why it is crucial for developing
countries to possess adequate human resources capable of
efficiently managing the privatization program.
Table 10 indicates the contribution of the PEs
privatized before and after privatization. It reveals that
before privatization the PEs’ total value is CFAF 41.8
billion and contributes 8.4 percent to the gross domestic
product (GDP) . After privatization, the PEs’ total value
stands at CFAF 45.9 billion with a contribution in the GDP
of 9.2 percent. The increase of CFAF 4.1 billion in the
total value of the PEs privatized can be attributed to
privatization. By selling its shares, the state has














































**GDP = CFA 498,800,000,000. GDP of Côte d’Ivoire in 1995 is FF 4,988,000,000.
It was converted in CFA by taking as an exchange rate FF 1 = CFA 100.
Source (GDP) the International Financial Statistics, December, 1998, P. 254.
*** The value for (PE,AP) was derived from table 1-9
Table 10 (in 1995 CFAF)
Contribution of the PE5 privatized before and after Privatization
(P~,BP)* (PE/CDP**, BP) (PE, AP)*** (PE/GDP, AP)
in 000s CFAF in 000s CFAF
Elf Oil-Cl 510,000
Total 41,899,541.387.36 0.084000684
*The value for (PE,BP) was derived from table 1-9
C
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The manner in which the increase occurred is what deter—
mines if a concentration of the shares of the privatized
PEs occurred or not. The author points out here that
although the state has withdrawn somewhat from the economy,
what is important for this dissertation is to find out if
only a few or the population at large benefitted from the
transfer of the state’s shares to the private sector.
Table 11 elaborates on how the state has decreased its
shares owned in the different organizations that have been
privatized. For instance, the state owned CFAF 516.27
million worth of shares of FILTISSAC before privatization,
and after privatization it owns nothing. This indicates
that the state has sold all its shares of FILTISSAC after
privatization. This example shows how the state has been
able to change its ownership due to privatization.
Furthermore, table 11 points out that the ownership of
shares of the state before privatization was valued at CFAF
30.3 billion and reached CFAF 9.1 billion after privatiza
tion. This represents a decrease of CFAF 21.2 billion of
the ownership of the state. The change of the state
ownership led to a reduction of the contribution of the
state to the GDP from 6.02 percent to 1.81 percent,
respectively from before to after privatization (see table
11>.
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Organizations in which the State, ES State, AP
state had or has some shares








Elf Oil—Cl 255,000,000 102,000,000
Total value of the state 30,950,303,491.24 9,055,257,583.81
ownership
Total state/GDP 0.062049526 0.018154085
Note: this table is derived from the tables (of the evaluation of PE) in
chapter 4
SMB
Table 12 presents a distinction between the value of the
shares owned by the non—state entities before privatization
to that of the non-state entities after privatization. This
comparison reveals how the decrease of participation of the
state in the affairs of the country led to more
participation of the private sector in the economy. This
researcher notes that the organizations or institutions
The decrease of the contribution of the state to the
GDP of the country clearly swnbolizes the withdrawal of the
state from the affairs of the country.
Table 11 (in 1995 CFAF)
Breakdown of the value of the PE5 privatized for the state
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involved with the PEs privatized have increased, decreased,
or did not change their ownership. For exanple, Agha Khan
Fund owned CFAF 757.38 million worth of shares before









































Table 12 (in 1995 CEAF)
Breakdown of the value of the PE5 privatized according to the
institutions or organizations owning some shares in these PE5, for
Before Privatization (BP), and After Privatization (AP)
Institutions and (Non state, BP) (Non state, AS)
organizations owning
some shares in the PEs
privatized





from table 1—9Note: this table is derived
Table 12 (Continued)
Breakdown of the value of the PEs privatized according to the
institutions or organizations owning some shares in these PEs; for
Before Privatization (BP), and After Privatization CAP)
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Institutions and (Non state, BP) (Non state, AP)
organizations owning





Other privates 113,387,919.47 113,387,919.47
Octide 5,873,989,560.16








Elf Oil—Africa 254,796,000 848,396,000
Other privates 204,000 204,000
Stock market 678,400,000
Total 10,949,237,898.14 36,942,040,774.17
(Total non-state/GOP, BP) 0.021951159
(Total non—state/GOP, AP) 0.07406183
Note: this table is derived from table 1—9
SIR (Société Ivoirienne de Rafinerie) owned CFAF 27.5
million before privatization but owned CFAF 2.8 billion
worth of shares after privatization. This represents a
substantial increase of the ownership of SIR.
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The researcher remarks that the ownership of shares of the
companies participating in the privatization process
increased from CThF 10.9 billion to Cm? 36.9 billion. This
is an augmentation of Cm? 26 billion. It represents an
increase from 2 percent to 7 percent in the contribution of
the GDP of the companies participating in the privatization
process (see table 12). The change of ownership value of the
companies participating in privatization identifies the
transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector.
Thus, privatization has allowed the private sector to
participate more in the affairs of the country.
Privatization has allowed more participation of the
private sector in the affairs of the country. However, the
distribution of shares of privatized PE5 will point out the
concentration of ownership.
Before tackling this issue, the researcher calculated
the total ownership value of organizations or institution(s)
that participated more than once in the privatization
process, in table 13. For instance, the stock market was
utilized five times, and its total value amounted to C~F
4.7 billion. It was used in the privatization of FILTISSAc,
SICOR, SICABLE, Elf-OIL, and Shell. The total value in table
13 is used in the development of table 14.
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Table 13 (in 000s 1995 CFAF)
Summation of the value of the shares of the shareholders that appears
more than one time after privatization in Table 12









4,674,513.317,87 851,359.754,67 2,008,940 876,396
table is derived from table 12
Earlier, the researcher recognized that privatization
led the private Sector to participate more in the affairs of
the country; however the organization(s) or institution(s)
that benefitted from privatization must be distinguished to
analyze wether or not there is a concentration phenomenon.
Table 14 has been developed to distinguish the
organization(s) and institution(s) that benefitted from
privatization to analyze the concentration phenomenon. This
table shows the participants of the privatization by the
value of the shares own. The researcher notes for instance
that the value of the state’s shares after privatization is
CFAF 9.05 billion; so the state is the second most important









Table 14 (in CEAF 1995)
value of shares own by the state
and organizations after privatization
Shareholders Value of the shares own by the
state and non—state AP
State 9,055,257,583.81











Note: derived from table 12 and 13
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Table 14 (continued)
value of shares owned by the
state and organizations after privatization
Shareholders Value of the shares owned by













Note: derived from table 12 and 13
Table 15 classifies the shareholders of the public
enterprises privatized by ascending order of their shares
value and their corresponding percentage in the total value
of the shares of the privatized public enterprises between
1994 and 1995. Table 15 shows that Bereby Finance (a mutual
fund) is the major shareholder of the privatized PEs. In
effect with CFAF 11 billion Bereby Finance owns 23.91
percent of the shares of the companies that have been
privatized. The state remains relatively present in the




Classification of the shareholders by ascending order of their shares













































Note: derived from table 14
*Qbtajfled by dividing each shareholder value
shares
by the total value of
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Table 15 (continued)
Classification of the shareholders by ascending order of their shares






















The third most important shareholder after privatization is
OCTIDE (a holding company) which owns CFAF 5.9 billion. This
represents 12.77 percent of the shares of the privatized
PE5. The combining ownership shares of OCTIDE and Bereby
Finance (two companies that are in the same line of business
in the sense that they search to establish dominant position
in other organization by buying shares) represents a value




Percentage value* of Value of the shares
shares in ascending owned by the state














45, 997, 298, 357 .98





Note: derived from table 14
*Obtained by dividing each shareholder value
shares
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percent of the shares owned after privatization. One can
clearly see that these two actors were the predominant ones
during that period of privatization. This is in agreement
with the statement that only organizations that are well
connected and have the most capital will be able to benefit
from the privatization process. The fact that Bereby F’inance
and OCTIDE own most of the shares of the privatized PEs in
Côte d’Ivoire shows that there is a concentration of the
privatized PEs shares in the hands of a few. This should not
come as a surprise because with a capital market yet to be
developed, the government searched for large corporations
with the financial mean to support the privatization
program.
In addition, the author notes that the stock market has
been much present in the privatization process. In effect,
the total value of shares that were sold on the stock
market, represents CFAF 4.7 billion. It corresponds to 10.16
percent of the shares of privatized PE5. This is relatively
significant because it indicates that there is an effort
here made by the government to make the shares of public
enterprises readily accessible to the population at large.
However, when one looks at the facts as presented by the
writer regarding the concentration of the shares of
privatized PE5, one realizes that the effort to include
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the small investor in the privatization program remained
marginal. This explains for instance why small investors
such as the personnel of the privatized PEs owned only CFAF
29.9 million shares. This ownership value is negligible
compared to the total amount of shares that have been
privatized. Therefore, the government effort to attract
investors other than the large organizations seems marginal.
To start with, it is interesting to note that when the
shares of the PEs were bought by the mutual fund and the
holding company the value of the privatized PEs decreased.
Thus the value of SAPH and SOGE went respectively from CEAF
14 and CFAF 21 billion respectively, before privatization to
CFAF 12.9 and CFAF 19.4 billion after privatization. The
researcher noticed that these are the only two instances
under which the value of the public enterprises decreased in
value after privatization. This decrease is probably linked
to the higher leverage that the mutual fund and holding
company have to buy the public enterprises. In addition,
while analyzing the data the writer remarked that OCTIDE was
not mentioned as one of the principal shareholders of SICOR
after privatization because 51 percent of the shares owned
by the state had been distributed to the stock market.
Nevertheless, according to Ziady, OCTIDE has bought out
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SICOR as well as SAPH.57 The revealing aspect of this case
is as follows: François Bakou, the CEO of OCTIDE was one of
the “golden boys” of coffee—cocoa. It has been said that he
was able to buy the shares of the companies indicated above
because he was a front man either for the office of the
president or for wealthy and powerful Ivoiriens that wanted
to remain anonymous (here again one notes the desire for
secrecy by investors about their transactions) ~58 When
confronted with the question of the origin of the financial
resources of his company, Bakou a former executive of
Cargill (an American corporation) pretended having made
fortune in the transaction of rice.59
One can speculate that OCTIDE was able to buy SICOR
either because it owned the majority of the 51 percent
state’s shares distributed on the stock market or because it
bought a percentage of shares that was at least superior at
20 percent. Twenty percent is the percentage of shares owned
by the next majority shareholder after the state before
privatization. Also one could argue that OCTIDE could have
been one of the shareholders of SICOR before privatization,
57Hassan Ziady, “La Côte d’Ivoire est-elle bien Gérée?”




and if that was the case it has become a majority
shareholder after privatization by buying more shares. This
analysis points out what the researcher indicated earlier in
this dissertation that it was very complex to discover the
identity of the shareholders of the privatized PEs in Côte
d’Ivoire, and that the analysis could only be done at the
organization level. Despite this difficulty, this example
illustrates clearly how people or organizations that are
well connected and have the financial resources can take
advantage of the privatization program to accumulate shares.
CHAPTER 2
PRIVATIZATION: CONTEXTUALIZATION
From developing to developed countries, privatization
has been one of the most revolutionary innovations in the
recent history of economic policy.’ The revealed preferences
of the world’s governments have accounted for the increasing
importance of privatization.2 Accordingly, while the public
enterprise sector has expanded from World War Two through
the 1970s, it has contracted or remained stable in the 1980s
and early 199Qs.3 This shows how valuable privatization has
become in conducting economic policy from the early 1970s
until today.
‘Steve H. Hanke, ed., “Privatization in the Developing
World” in Privatization and Development (San Francisco: ICS
Press, 1987), 3.
2Ahmed Galal, Leroy Jones, Pankaj Tandon, and Ingo
Voselang, Welfare Conseguences of Selling Public
Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis (New York: Oxford




The reasons prompting privatization are different in
developed and developing countries depending upon the
context in which privatization programs have been
undertaken. However, no matter the context in which
privatization has been developed, in developing countries
one should bear in mind that PEs’ efficiency should be
undertaken from an equity perspective. Bruno, Ravallion and
Squire indicate that their findings (which will be discussed
further in the significance of the study) illustrate that
growth has a positive effect on the reduction of poverty in
developing countries when there is less inequality in these
countries to start with. The definition of efficiency and
new evidence on growth seem to suggest that the activities
promoting efficiency need to be tackled with those promoting
equity. In addition, the evidence just mentioned suggest
that it is necessary for developing countries to undertake
activities that are promoting efficiency and equity if these
countries are seeking to maintain sustainable growth that
leads to development. In the next section the author
discussed the reason why the developed and the developing
countries have adopted privatization as a tool to make their
public enterprises more efficient.
57
1. Context and Motives of Privatization in Developed
Countries
a. Context of Privatization in DeveloDed Countries
As stated earlier, privatization has been taking place
in most of the countries, developed or developing.4 The sale
of public enterprises has been worldwide and reached a total
of more than $185 billion in the 1980s.5 To understand why
governments have been rushing to implement privatization, it
is necessary to comprehend the context in which
privatization has been developed. In effect, Vernon shows
that in the l980s, the acute need for cash for public
funding in the developing and developed countries accounted
for the simultaneous global implementation of
privatization.6 However, it is imperative here to divide
countries into two camps: developed and developing. This is
fundamental in understanding the context in which these
different camps adopted privatization. More significantly,
this classification allows one to see that developed
countries embraced privatization first before it became an
integral part of a policy option for developing countries.
4Rashdan, 68.
5John B. Goodman and Gary W. Loveman, “Does Privatization
Serve the Public Interest?” Harvard Business Review
(November-December 1991) : 26.
6Vernon, 5.
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Understanding the sequence of implementation of
privatization in developed and developing countries permits
one to recognize why privatization is only one option. For
example, countries could choose not to privatize the PE5 but
instead restructure them to solve their debts and deficits.
In certain circumstances privatization could be counter
productive to the democratic objective of inclusion pursued
by most of these developing countries. If privatization is
counter productive, it could hamper the economic development
of these countries. This then leads to an examination of the
reasons that countries from Europe to the United States have
been developing and implementing privatization in the first
place. Reviewing the case of Europe’s privatization, one
discovers that with her accession to power in 1979, Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher dismantled the economy dominated
by the state-owned industries by adopting privatization.7 As
Saunders, and Harris explain the British government wanted
to reduce inflation. To do so they decided that cutting back
the government borrowing will be necessary. Thus, the
Thatcher government devised privatization as one scheme
among others to be used to reach such objective. By
privatizing the government will earn revenue from the sale
of the public enterprises as well as no longer have the
7Rashdan, 73.
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burden to cover the deficit of loss—making public
companies.9 It was under these circumstances that the
British government embarked on privatizing its public
enterprises. In fact, one of the largest sales regarding
privatization occurred in Britain, where investors paid more
than $10 billion for twelve regional electricity
companies.’° Furthermore, the Thatcher government sold more
than $20 billion in state assets by shedding British
Airways, British Telecom, and British Gas.1’ Sales of
public enterprises have also amounted up billions of dollars
in France and Italy.’2 In the OECD countries, one hundred
seventy enterprises have been privatized between 1980 and
1991 .‘~
In the United States, city officials have been faced
with increased demands for public services and strong
resistance to further tax increases.
9Peter Sanders and Cohn Harris, Privatization and
Popular Capitalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994),
19.
10GoocJman and Loveman, 27.
‘1lbid., 32.
12Ibid.
‘3Asfaw Kumssa, “The Political Economy of Privatization
in Sub—Saharan Africa,” International Review of
Administrative Sciences 62, no. 1 (March 1996): 81.
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In an attempt to save and meet the demand for public
services, city officials have turned to privatization of
public services.14 As a result, in a survey of sixty—six of
America’s largest cities, only three have not privatized any
public services.’5 The ten most privatized services in
America’s sixty six largest cities in 1995 were: vehicle
towing, solid waste collection, building security, street
repair, ambulance services, printing services, street
lighting/signals, drug/alcohol treatment centers, employment
and training and legal services.
b. Motives for Privatization in Developed Countries
As reviewed, policy makers in developed countries have
been undertaking privatization as an economic policy option.
Cowan explained that:
In the 1980s, the movement toward reducing the state
in the affairs of the country has been Gaining
currency in developed countries because the
government—owned sector was in deficit, and needed
more and more subsidies to stay afloat. This has
convinced policy makers that a new approach was
‘4Robert Jay Dilger,Randolf R. Moffet, and Linda Struyk,
“Privatization of Municipal Services in America’s Largest




needed to undertake certain activities that the
state was performing.’6
Furthermore, the rationale for adopting privatization in the
developed world was based on the neoclassic ideology of
“laissez faire.” Policy makers were convinced that the
neoclassic ideology will prevail under the circumstances in
which the developed countries were functioning (as reviewed
earlier) . Kumssa summarized well this belief when he states
the following:
Privatization’s growing appeal stems from the
ideology of neoclassical economists, who
desire less government intervention in the
economy and believe in the superior economic
performance of the private sector. According
to neoclassical economists, a free—market
economy without state intervention will lead
to economic prosperity that will ‘trickle—
down’ to the poorest members of society.
Therefore, government intervention in the
economy is considered unnecessary and harmful
to the economy, because it acts as a brake
on economic progress. Privatization was developed
within this framework of neoclassical economic
theory that advocates liberalization of the
economy and the circumspection of the state role
in the economy.’7
This ‘trickle—down’ economy mentioned above may be easily
adopted in developed countries and have the desired effects
because they have the institutions, labor, and financial
resources to carry out such endeavors. However, when it
16L. Gray Cowan, “A Global Overview of Privatization” in
Privatization and Development, ed. Steve H. Hanke (San
Francisco: CIS Press, 1987), 7.
‘7Kumssa, 79.
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comes to developing countries, such institutions, manpower,
and financial resources are lacking. Yet, developing
countries have been embarking on the privatization of their
public enterprises. To understand the reasons why developing
countries have been implementing privatization, one has to
refer to the context in which such policy has been embraced.
This context accounts for the reason that public
enterprises, venerated after the independence of developing
countries to help in the development process, are now
discarded to reach the same objective. One must realize that
if these public enterprises were set up in the first place
it is because the private sector was nonexistent and needed
to be developed.
2. Context and Motives of Privatization in Developing
Countries
a. Context of Privatization in Developing Countries
a.1 Privatization in Structural Adjustment Program
Governments in the developing countries were faced with
increasing deficits in the state—owned sector and
experiencing macroeconomic disequilibrium to regulate their
economy to honor their debts. The developing countries
adopted privatization as part of the Structural Adjustment
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Program (SAP) developed by the WB and the IMF to reduce
their governments deficits.17 Privatization has formed part
of the reform package developed to address the debt crisis
those developing countries were facing in the 1980s.’8
As a case in point, Danso argues that SAP has been the
predominant prescription to tackle Africa’s economic malaise
derived from excess domestic demand, overvalued exchange
rates, trade controls, and deficit financing in the l980s.’~
SAP recognizes that Africa has an overextended state-owned
sector. To solve these problems, SAP emphasizes the
necessity to privatize public enterprises, reduce the size
of public services and budget deficits, impose a ceiling on
government borrowing from the banking system, and remove
price control and devaluate the currency. Privatization, as
it is presented here, is simple and straight forward.
However, when one incorporates all the aspects of
~7Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, The Political
Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization, ed. Ezra
N. Suleiman and John Waterbury (Oxford: Westerview Press,
Inc., 1990), 5
18Sarath Rajapatirana, W. Max Gorden, Richard N. Cooper,
and I.M. D.Little, Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment: The
Macroeconomic Experience of Developing Countries (New York:
Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993), 1.
19Alex Danso, “Privatization of State Owned Enterprises
in Africa: The Case of Ghana,” Southeastern Political Review
XX, no. 2 (Fall 1992) : 335.
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privatization it is seen as a tool to change the economic
and social role of the state thereby making privatization a
central plank for SAP strategy.2° In spite the fact that SAP
is one instrument for promoting privatization in developing
countries, India and Tanzania were countries that tackled
market-supporting reforms without tremendous coercion from
external institutions such as the IMF.21 Dinavo concurred
with the fact that most developing countries and the Bretton
Wood organizations (the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund) have supported privatization as a policy for
developing countries.22 However, Kumssa eloquently
summarized the concern of most developing countries when he
argues the following:
The privatization thesis is based on the assumption
that an overextend state is what distorts
development, and therefore the role of the state in
the economy of sub-saharan Africa (SSA) should be
limited and its activities rolled back. However,
this argument ignores the reasons for the growth
of the role of the public sector in SSA’s economy
in the first place. The active role of the
state was necessary to redirect internaleconomic
activity, to protect indigenous enterprises
against multinational monopolies and redefine
the position of SSA economy within the global
economy. Specific social and economic problems
20Brendan Martin, In the Public Interest? Privatization





required state intervention in general and the
formation of public enterprises in particular.24
The argument developed above by Kumssa is also valid for
other developing countries besides those of Africa. One can
understand why Kumssa has reservations concerning
implementing privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
countries are not well equipped to foster such programs.
Although, developing countries have resisted privatization,
it has been implemented.
a.1.1 The Practice of Privatization in Developing
Countries
Governments have started privatization in developing
countries from Latin America to Asia. In Latin America, the
Mexican government privatized both Aeromexico and Mexicana
airlines, from 1988 to 1992, and deregulated the airlines
industry.25 This permitted the new airline, Taesa to enter
the industry and make it more competitive. However, in 1993
Aeromexico and Mexicana merged, and these two airlines now
24Kumssa, 80.
25Miguel D. Ramirez, “Privatization and Regulatory
Reform in Mexico and Chile: A Critical Overview,” Ih~.
Ouarterly Review of Economics and Finance 38, no.3 (Fall
1998) : 424.
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control more than 70 percent of the domestic market for air
travel.26 From 1985 to 1990, the Chilean government
privatized thirty state enterprises such as:
telecommunications, electricity generation and distribution,
water and sanitation facilities, and the national airline,
LAN-Chile.27 The Chilean government has involved workers in
the privatization process by allowing them to buy shares of
public enterprises that have been privatized.28
In Argentina, the government launched a privatization
program that involved the sale of its telephone monopoly,
national airline and petrochemical company for more than
$2.1 billion.29
In Asia, the privatization of a country like Turkey has
amounted to $900 million in the first two months of 1997.
Moreover, in 1997 the government of Turkey sold three banks
that raised $320 million.30 Privatization in this part of
the world did not go without challenges. For instance, in
September 1995, Renong, a big Malaysian group bought a




29Goodman and Loveman, 27.
30”Will Asian Privatization Be Watered Down in Manila?”
Th~ Economist, February 1-7, 1997, 64.
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However, the sale was stopped and transferred to the court
because a local Manila firm obtained a restraining order on
the grounds that they should offer the historical building
to a Filipino firm first.3’
In the newly liberated countries in Eastern Europe,
privatization played an important role in their transition
to a market economy. Consequently, in 1990 alone, the
German Democratic Republic, the Treuhandanstalt (the public
trust agency charged by the government with the task of
privatization) sold three hundred companies for approxima
tely $1.8 billion.’2 In Sub—Saharan Africa, from 1980 to
1991, three hundred seventy three state-owned enterprises
were privatized.” In 1992, the Nigerian government sold
ninety out of one hundred twenty public enterprises.’4
Likewise, the government of Kenya stated in 1993 that they
would sell twenty out of one hundred twenty companies to be
privatized to private buyers. The privatized companies
included, among others, Kenyan Airways, the Gilgil
Telecommunication Manufacturing and two sugar refineries.”
‘1lbid.





b. The Motives of Privatization in Developing Countries
Although there exists many motives for implementing
privatization in developing countries, Cook and Kirkpatrick
espouse two of them. They show that the large size of the
public sector is the first reason for starting privatization
in developing countries.36 The second reason to undertake
privatization in developing countries is the inefficiency of
PE5.37 PE5 were established to promote industrialization,
savings, investment and growth.38 Granting that, it is not
clear that the public enterprises are less efficient than
the private ones. Cook and Kirkpatrick stated that the
Bretton Wood institutions have nevertheless concluded that
the PE5 were not able to reach the objectives assigned to
them. This argument led Gallaghy and Wilson to assert that
the drive toward privatization in the African countries has
been motivated by their need for cash and credit.39
To sum up, the major motives for the privatization of
PE5 in developed and developing countries are the state’s
36Cook and Kirkpatrick, 9-10.
371bid., 10-11.
38Ibid.
39Thomas M. Gallaghy and Ernest J. Wilson III, “Africa:
Policy, Reality or Ritual?” in The Promise of Privatization:
A Challenge for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., 1988), 185-186.
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extended role in the economy of these countries and the
inefficiency of their public enterprises.
A major question that remained unanswered is the
following: should policy, such as privatization, be
implemented without regard to equity? If so then one can
argue that policy makers are approaching economic growth
like it is independent from equity. However, are they
independent? This is the crucial question that the writer
discusses in the following section. As stated earlier, this
specific relation between economic growth and equity is
addressed in the significance of the study.
3. Siçnificance of the Study
Earlier, the writer argued that the developed and
developing countries have adopted privatization in different
contexts. However, one must also point out that the ultimate
goal of privatization in developed and in developing
countries has been to stimulate growth by making public
enterprises more efficient. Although growth is essential,
equity is equally necessary to developing countries. This
is why it means a great deal that policy makers pay
attention to the broadening of PE’s assets when privatizing.
The Washington Consensus seems to suggest that equity
can be tackled later when growth has been achieved.
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Solimano summarizes this contention by arguing:
In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, development
theory emphasized market failures, discontinuities,
irreversibilities, and excessive social inequality.
The dominant development paradigm stressed the need
for the state to create an adequate physical
infrastructure and the institutional and social
conditions required for development... In l980s
and l990s, this paradigm changed. In a way,
development problems were reduced to growth
problems, and the lack of sustained growth,
particularly in the l980s in Latin America, was
thought to have resulted from state interference
in the market process, both internationally
through trade protection and nationally through the
over regulation of goods, capital, and labor
markets, and extended state ownership of national
productive assets •40
It is vital to note here that the same analysis was done for
all developing countries from Africa to Asia. The argument
developed by the Washington Consensus shows how the state
has been an obstacle to development in developing countries,
and suggests that development has to be approach
differently. Regarding the argument of the Washington
Consensus Solimano asserts:
Economic growth (material progress) became the
main development goal in the policies known
as the Washington consensus. Growth has to
be supported by (1) macroeconomic stabilization
-understood basically as the reduction of
inflation and fiscal deficits- and (2)
structural reforms such as trade liberalization,
40Andrés Solimano, Beyond Unequal Development: An
Overview in Distributive Justice and Economic Development:
The Case of Chile and Developing Countries, eds. Andrés
Solimano, Eduardo Aninat, and Nancy Birdsall (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 17.
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financial deregulation, privatization, and a
decisive shift to a smaller state role economy.4’
One notes the prominence of privatization and the withdrawal
of the state in the affairs of the country in the policy
orientation of the Washington Consensus. In addition, the
central argument of the Washington Consensus is based on the
“trickle—down” effect that the writer mentioned previously.
This “trickle—down” effect assumes a tradeoff between rapid
growth and the reduction of income inequality.42 The
explanations for this tradeoff are given by Nicholas Kaldor
and Simon Kuznets:
First, the classical savings hypothesis, used
by Nicholas Kaldor in his growth models, argued
that since a high level of saving is a perquisite
for rapid growth in a capitalist society income
must be concentrated in the hands of rich
capitalists, whose marginal propensity to save
is relatively high with respect to that of other
economic group. Second, Kuznets (1955) observed
that during the development process labor shifts
from a low productivity sector (traditional
agriculture) to higher-productivity sector
(Manufacturing) and therefore economy—wide
inequality must initially increase if it is
to later decrease as income per capita rises
during the course of economic development.43
This analysis suggests that a concentration of economic
resources (income) in the hands of a few is a necessary





Consequently, if there is a concentration of resources
(shares of public enterprises) in the hands of a few during
the privatization process, it is beneficial for the country
because according to Kaldor and Kuznets it will allow
savings to increase and investment to take place. That will
stimulate rapid growth and thus contribute to the
development of the country. So from the conservative view,
even if the shares of public enterprises privatized are not
reaching most of the population that is not a hurdle because
most of the population will benefit from the saving and
investment afterward. The question that is not answered here
is the following: what is the majority of the population
supposed to do while it is watching the “few” accumulate the
economic resources of the country? In addition, one should
not forget that with the democratization process that is
underway in developing countries, citizens are seeking to be
active participants in the affairs of their country.
Therefore, it seems there is a danger here to see
privatization strictly from the conservative view without
incorporating equity in the analysis when one knows quite
well that inequality is prevalent at the beginning of this
process in developing countries. In addition, there is some
precedence concerning the issue of inequality and what might
happen when such a thing takes place or when policy makers
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do not take into account the realities that are prevailing
in a given country. As Sandbrook points out:
Political demonstrations and riots rocked
most one party—states and military juntas
between 1989 and 1991. People were fed up
with erratic, self—serving, and corrupt not
to mention oppressive governance.44
Furthermore, Sandbrook points out as an example that:
When President Houphouet-Boighny of Côte
d’Ivoire announced, in early 1990, salary
cuts for civil servants to cope with revenue
shortfalls and a heavy debt service burden,
the response was a wave of strikes and
demonstrations. For the first time,
demonstrators called for the resignation
of the venerable president, and dozens of
teachers were arrested during the march riot
in Abidjan.45
This is the reason it is vital that policy makers take into
account the inequality existing in developing countries when
privatizing.
As discussed, the Washington Consensus perceives
economic growth as a main engine for reducing inequality and
the improvement of living standards. Indeed, economic growth
does generate benefits as Solimano recognizes:
Growth directly generates employment and real
income for labor market participants and provides
—through tax receipts— fiscal revenues to the
44Richard Sandbrook, “The Rediscovery of Politics” in
The Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993) 1.
45Richard Sandbrook, “False Starts: Capitalist and
Socialist” in The Politics of Africa’s Economy Recovery
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 44.
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state that can be used to finance social
policies 46
Although one notes that economic growth is important, the
Neo—Jceynesian and endogenous growth theories argue that it
is not sufficient. They view growth as an investment—driven
process and stress complementarity between growth and social
equity.47 Solimano in agreeing with these theories suggests:
A growing economy is bound to ease
distributional conflict as competing claims
are over a “growing pie” rather than
constituting a zero—sum game. However,
economic growth also has limitations as
a mechanism to enable poverty reduction
and the improvement of living standards.
First, the potential of growth for poverty
reduction depends not only on the level
of growth but on its composition: it has
to be labor intensive and must benefit
unskilled labor. The spatial (or regional)
composition of production must favor poorer
regions more than others. Second, GDP, or
any aggregate output measure, is a yardstick
that omits distributive considerations.. ~48
According to the statement above, growth can be limited due
to the structure that already exists in the country.
Therefore, it is in the interest of the developing country
to alleviate any obstacle such as inequality to allow growth
to be more beneficial for the country.





not sufficient; policies also have to be oriented toward
increasing individual productivity and earning capacities.
These activities are crucial to matching economic growth
with better income distribution and less poverty.
The stock market may assist in this process by allowing the
population at large to buy shares of privatized public
enterprises. Solimano follows by saying that:
Policies on asset distribution regarding land
reform and broad—based ownership of productive
capital -say following privatization- are also
worth considering.49
Solimano suggests here that policy makers should integrate
the democratization and broadening of assets regarding land
and public enterprises in the privatization process.
Furthermore, there is some unequivocal new evidence
pointing out that growth policy should be carried out with
equity. In effect, Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, after
reviewing some evidence on developing countries reveal that:
High—inequality countries, such as a number in Latin
America and Africa, have lower growth and remain
inegalitarian, whereas low—inequality countries,
such as many East Asia, remain egalitarian and
achieve rapid poverty reduction from the process of
growth. Theoretical underpinnings of this reverse
linkage are only gradually being understood.
Some lines of argument originate from political
economy considerations: concentration of wealth,
such as land or human capital, leads to policies
that protect sectarian interests and impede growth
49Ibid., 31.
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for the rest of society; inequality may also
contribute to political instability.50
This is the new evidence that the writer was alluding to
when he stated that growth was linked to equity in
developing countries. As one notes the argument developed by
Bruno, Ravillion and Squire, indicates that growth is better
supported by less inequality. In addition, as indicated
earlier, the efficiency of the public enterprises are at the
core of the urgency to privatize. Defining efficiency is
thus necessary here. According to Field:
From the standpoint of society at large,
production is at an efficient level when
marginal production costs; that is, when net
benefits are maximized not matter to whom
those benefits accrue, efficiency does not
distinguish among people. A dollar of net
benefits to one person is considered to be
worth a dollar to anybody else. One hundred
dollars of benefits to one person is considered
to be worth the same as one dollar of benefits
to each of one hundred people. In the real world,
an outcome that benefits very rich people at the
expense of poor people would be regarded by most
people as unequal. This is simply another way of
saying that an outcome that is efficient in this
sense need not necessarily be equitable.5’
50Michael Bruno, Martin Ravallion, and Lyn Squire,
“Equity and Growth in Developing Countries: Old and New
Perspectives on the Policy Issues,” in Distributive Justice
and Economic development: The Case of Chile and Developing
Countries (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
2000), 38.
51Barry C. Field, “Economic Efficiency and Markets” in
Environmental Economics: An Introduction, eds. Lucille H.
Sutton and Ira C. Robert (New York: Mcgraw—Hill Companies,
Inc., 1997), 65.
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Here, the author notices that in the above definition, Field
clearly states that efficiency does not necessarily take
into account the fact that in a country, great inequality
may be present. This is the reason privatization represents
an opportunity to tackle such issues in developing
countries. Privatization will help to redistribute the
benefits gained from privatization. This redistribution will
be necessary because PE5’ efficiency does not address the
issue of the beneficiaries of privatization as indicated.
Interesting enough this issue could be tackled by broadening
the assets of privatized PE5. This view is even reinforced
by the following statement of Field:
Equity is tied closely to the distribution
of wealth in a society. If this distribution
is regarded as essentially fair, then judgments
about alternative output levels may justifiably
be made using only the efficiency criterion.
But if wealth is distributed unfairly, the
efficiency criterion by itself may be to
narrow 52
Here, one realizes why the notion of equity should be an
integral part of the privatization process in developing
countries. In developing countries the disparity of income
between rich and poor is great. For instance, according to
Solimano both Latin America and developing countries overall




In addition, the linkage between efficiency and equity
reinforces the importance of the endogenous and Neo
Keynesien theories when considering growth in developing
countries. Therefore, echoing the limit of growth oriented
theory Solimano asserts:
The experience of the 1990s is showing that
the combination of fiscal adjustment and market
liberalization, although necessary policy steps
to reduce macro imbalances and increase
efficiency, is insufficient to bring about
stable and equitable development.54
As discussed earlier, inequity in the distribution of
economic resources seems counterproductive to growth.
Moreover, Solimano introduces the fact that in the l990s
several explanations have been developed to relate
positively growth to equity.55 This positive relation is
stated as follows:
First, increased equity can stimulate growth
by increasing political and macroeconomic
stability, as distributive conflict is less
acute in more egalitarian societies . . . Second,
a more egalitarian distribution of income and
or access to education and credit are likely
to boost the savings capacity and investment
opportunities of the poor, which in turn will
have a positive impact on growth, reversing the
traditional Kaldorian story, which is centered
on the differential class-based saving behavior





This statement elaborates on the reasons why equity must be
present in the distribution of economic resources. It
implies that in privatizing public enterprises the focus
should be put on the policy design that will benefit most of
the population. This is not to suggest that if the
privatization program succeeded in rendering public
enterprises efficient but did not focus on equally
distributing the shares of the privatized PE5 among the
population, it has failed. However, privatization is an
opportunity for the state to make a contribution toward the
reduction of inequality in the country (which is a potent
problem of our planet) thus contributing positively to the
country’s economic growth. Why is it so important that
distributive justice must be an integral part of the
privatization program? Here, defining what is meant by
distributive justice is imperative. Regarding the issue at
hands, Solimano writes:
If observed income and wealth inequality
reflects, to a large extent, differences
in initial endowments of wealth, talent,
family connections, race, or gender-factors
mostly beyond the control of the individual
or (in philosophical terms) a set of “morally
arbitrary” factors- then inequality becomes an
ethical issue, as key wealth-creating factors
are beyond the control of the individual.57
Interesting enough this state of affairs is even more
57Ibid., 19.
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prevalent in developing countries than it is in developed
ones. The gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” is so
large that tackling inequality is imperative for policy
makers. Following the discussion on distributive justice
Solimano stipulates:
.Observed inequality of income, wealth, or
consumption can and do also reflect individual
differences in effort, ambition, and risk
taking. To the extent that these elements
reflect personal preferences and belong to
the realm of “individual responsibility,”
they do not constitute an ethical problem
from the view point of distributive justice.58
Solimano adds:
This sharp separation between arbitrary and
nonarbitrary factors is blurred when it is
recognized that “morally arbitrary” factors
(e.g., initial wealth and talents) are likely
to be related to the formation of preferences
and the concept of individual responsibility,
two elements that ultimately influence effort
levels and the willingness to take risks.59
As pointed out earlier in this dissertation, the
distributive justice and the endogenous theories are
supporting each other. In effect, the argument of the
distributive theory constitutes the rationale for the
endogenous theory. The distributive theory supports the idea
of integrating the broadening of assets of public




its final analysis that the initial endowment of individuals
affects the way people behave in society. This implies that
without the intervention of the state to broaden the shares
of the privatized PEs, the only beneficiaries of
privatization will be the organizations and people that are
in financially strong positions in a given developing
economy. This is why privatization represents a “golden”
opportunity to integrate most of the population into the
mainstream of the development of the country.
In fact, Solimano observes that equality of access to
wealth-creating factors (equality of opportunity) is a valid
policy objective from the view point of distributive
justice.6° Furthermore, Solimano states that making equality
of opportunity the only valid criteria for social policy
bypasses the facts that effort and risk taking are not fully
independent of initial background conditions.61 This, then,
allows policy makers to develop policy to compensate those
relatively less lucky in the “birth lottery.”62
Therefore, by including most of the population in the





generally left out during the growth process will become
active participants in the country’s affairs.
This is the reason why in privatizing public
enterprises, it is in the best interest of the country to
broaden the distribution of public enterprises’ shares. It
is an opportunity to reduce inequality, promote
democratization, and stimulate growth. This in turn lays the
foundation for studying the privatization and the
redistribution of public assets in Câte d’Ivoire.
CRAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies are now extant in this field of
inquiry. These elaborate on the efficiency of implementing
privatization programs while others discuss the need to
incorporate into the analysis other aspects that are social
and structural in nature; yet others hone in on other
different issues that are links to privatization.
A. Privatization Debate
1. The Proponents of Privatization
Although privatization has its supporters, it also has
its opponents. The proponents of privatization base their
arguments on the efficiency aspect of privatization.
Authors, such as, Dinavo, Holden and Rajapatirana, Cook and
Kirkpatrick, and Waters, all cited earlier, provide
extensive elaboration on this side of privatization.
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Mostly, they see privatization as a way to shrink
government.’ They argue with presaging prescience that
privatization will make government and public enterprises
efficient. They see it as a policy to make developing
countries prosperous.
Dinavo contends that privatization will bring about
economic development and democracy in developing countries.2
If it is well implemented, citizens will freely participate
in purchasing shares of the privatized PEs.3 This is why the
broadening of ownership is vital while privatizing in
developing countries. Dinavo also asserts that to prosper
like the industrialized and semi-industrialized nations,
government in developing countries must privatize their
public enterprises.”
Although he acknowledges the benefit of privatization
of PE5, Rashdan argues that for privatization to be
introduced successfully, certain political, economic and
1Emanuel S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better
Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.,
1987), 3.
2Jacques V. Dinavo, Privatization in Developing
Countries: Its Impact on Economic Development and Democracy




institutional structures have to be present in the country.5
These include the following: (1)the announcement of the
government’s desire to embrace privatization; (2) the
devotion of the government to a consistent pursuit of
privatization; (3) potential competition and size of the
market; (4) accessibility of capital; (5) the desire of the
private sector to invest; (6) the general environmental
climate; (7) presence of financial institutions and
financial skills in the market; and the (8) simplification
of government procedures.
Holden and Rajapatirana suggest that by privatizing
their public enterprises, government put more resources in
the hands of the private sector thus promoting efficiency
and growth.6 They argue that efficiency and growth take
place because privatization reduces the government’s fiscal
burden and creates an environment for growth.7 They state
that the advantage of privatizing PE5 is based on the fact
that economic theory postulates that PE5 will become more
profitable under privatization because in the private sector
5Yahia Qassem Rashdan, “Privatization of Public
Enterprises and Its Applications to the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan” (Ph.D. diss., Golden Gate University, 1989), 186-
187.
6Paul Holden, and Sarath Rajapatirana, Unshackling the
Private Sector: A Latin American Story (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1995), 75.
7lbid.
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managers are rewarded by the market according to how well
the managers have increased shareholders value.8 In public
sector organizations, politicians and state bureaucrats do
not pursue the public interest or the will of the people
rather they promote their self interests.9
Cook and Kirkpatrick are of the contention that
privatization is advocated as a means of improving the
performance of the public enterprise sector. It is
accomplished by lessening the scope for political
intervention in the operation of the public enterprises; by
altering the structure of the property rights to improve the
incentive for efficiency performance; and by the change in
ownership that imposes the discipline of a private capital
market on the enterprise thereby improving efficiency.1°
While this argument may be valid in developed countries, it
has limited relevance in developing countries.” The major
limitation is evidenced by the fact that in most developing
countries the capital market is not well developed. This is
the reason why the development of stock market in developing
8Flolden and Rajapatirana, 77.
9lbid.
10Paul Cook, and Cohn Kirkpatrick, Privatization in




countries assists in the broadening of equity building
structures.
Waters indicates that economic theory recognizes that
because of the nature of ownership and incentives, a state
entity cannot be as efficient as a private one in the
production of the same output. He contends that the owners
or users control of an asset is positively correlated to its
value.’2 This explains why public enterprises tend to be
capital intensive. They are hoarders of equipment and have a
poor record in maintaining their assets. While in the
competitive private sector, assets are highly valued. The
owner can use the asset, perhaps improve it, and ultimately
capture the rewards of the asset.’3 He declares that the
prosperous nations have chosen the private sector to produce
and the state to purchase and distribute; those less
successful have set the state as producers.’4
a. Pros and Cons of the Position Taken by the
Proponents of Privatization
These authors thus advocate minimum state intervention
and maximum private incentive ruled by market forces.
‘2Alan Rufus Waters, “Privatization a Viable Policy,” in
Entrepreneurship and the Privatization of Government, ed.




Consequently, these authors pay little regard to counter
productive aspects of privatization. These aspects of
privatization are more fully dealt with by opponents of
privatization.
2. Opponents of Privatization
a. The Other Side of Privatizatjon
Authors such as Abramovitz, Sullivan, Kolderie, Vernon,
Stone, Bozeman, Danso, Hanke, and Adam focus on the
disadvantages of privatization.
Analyzing the privatization of the welfare state,
Abramovitz suggests that privatization redistribute
resources upward into the hands of private capital, leading
to greater intervention by the state in the economy.’5 The
return of the intervention of the state in the economy will
be necessary because the resources will be concentrated in
the hands of a few people or organizations. It is this
concentration consideration caused by privatization that the
writer intends to shed light on in this dissertation.
Sullivan’s study of the impact of privatization on
constitutional rights found that privatization threatens
constitutional rights since private institutions generally
‘5Mimi Abramovitz, “The Privatization of the Welfare
State: A Review,” Social Work 31, no.4 (July-August 1986)
262.
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are not subject to the normal constitutional restraints
imposed on governments.16 For instance, a Public Enterprise
(PE) will continue to serve a community even if it does not
realize a profit, while a private enterprise will stop
serving a particular community if it is not profitable.
Kolderie contends that privatization can serve a useful
purpose but it also carries some dangers to be avoided. He
suggests, the political articulation of a new concept,
combining equity in the provision of services with
competition in the production of these services.’7 This new
concept is needed because the private sector focuses mostly
on its bottom line while the public sector is more concerned
with the distributive aspect of providing resources to the
public. When a public enterprise is set up to serve a poor
community that did not have access to a service (for
instance transportation) it is assumed that this particular
organization will not necessarily be financially profitable.
This explains the reason why some PE5 are in deficits.
Vernon presents a similar argument when he states that state
‘6Harold J. Sullivan, “The Privatization of Public
Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Right,” Public
Administration Review 30, no. 5 (November/December 1987):
465.
‘7Ted Kolderie, “The Two Different Concepts of
Privatization,” Public Administration Review 46, no. 4
(July/August 1986) : 290.
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owned enterprises’ insatiable appetite for cash is perceived
as primarily due to the inefficiency of their managers and
workers. In reality, their deficits are more easily traced
to the policies of their government than to their own
inefficiencies.’8 Vernon refers here to the distributive
aspect of PEs. For instance in developing countries PEs have
been assigned the task of developing the whole capital
intensive~The large capital required of
PEs for developing this infrastructure will embroil them in
deficits. Following the same line of analysis, Stone points
out that:
Using the market to solve social ills is
solipsistic. This approach solved problems by
ignoring the social and public character of
privatization and treats policy simply as a
formula for the distribution of goods and
services. He proposes that instead of
seeking to eliminate bureaucracy from
the welfare function, perhaps it would
be better to change the ground rules under
which social services agencies operate.2°
Social problems such as the deficit financing of PEs do not
have simple solutions. Indeed, to solve this kind of dilemma
policy maker must identify the intricate relation (between
~ Vernon, ed., The Promise of Privatization~ A
Challenge for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., 1988), 4.
19Ibid.
20Clarence N. Stone, “Whither The Welfare State?
Professionalization, Bureaucracy, and the Market
Alternative,” Ethics 93, no. 3 (April 1983) : 595.
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political, economical, social and public activities) that
causes the deficit. Bozeman, states that:
Taken on a case by case basis, policy objectives
can be achieved either by the market or by
government agencies or joint venture between
the state and the private enterprises. It
suggests that privatization is not suitable
for certain policy objectives. He recommends
that the public administration examines with
an open mind the impact of government
funding, diffuse sovereignty, and new
organizational forms to lessen the adoption
of economic concept and theory to public
purposes for which they are not well suited.2’
Nevertheless, it can be argued that after the independence
of most developing countries they have the public sector as
their only suitable choice for building up their
infrastructure. Having presented the literature of the
opponents of privatization by authors such as Abramovitz,
Sullivan, Kolderie, Vernon, Stone, Bozeman, Danso, Hanke,
and Adam, the researcher analyzed the strengths and
weaknesses of these studies and specified their implication.
b. Pros and Cons of the Position Taken by the
Opponents of Privatization
The strength of these studies rests on the fact that
they examine some aspects of privatization not tackled
2’Barry Bozeman, “Exploring the Limits of Public and
Private Sectors: Sector Boundaries as maginot Line,” Public
Administration Review 48, no. 2 (March/April 1988) : 673.
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before; as such adding richness to the studies done by the
proponents of privatization. These critics of privatization
argue effectively that certain issues must be reviewed while
privatizing public enterprises. Failure to do so could be
counterproductive for the country.
These studies have dealt with the productive and non
productive aspect of privatization in developed and
developing countries. They also mentioned that privatization
can lead to a concentration of resources. However none of
them have elaborated on the fact that the privatization
redistribution of assets of public enterprises in developing
countries can lead to a concentration of resources. Thus,
this study focused on that aspect of privatization.
3. Other Issues under Privatizptjpn
Analyzing privatization in Ghana, Danso warns that
privatization must be carefully carried out in developing
countries. He contends that these countries, and
particularly African countries do not have the adequate
human resources nor the institutions to carry out such a
tremendous endeavor. He expresses that the improvement in
the achievement of PEs in the African countries such as
Ghana will be more likely obtained from enhancement in
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competition rather than a change in ownership.22 Those
changes in the marketplace include: autonomy of the PE5,
deregulation, autonomy of PEs vis—à—vis government
intervention, evaluation of managers of PE5 according to the
profitability of their organization and their mission,
development of accounting and procedures to monitor the PEs
financial health periodically. These modifications would
bring more profitability to the PEs. These conditions are
beneficial for the developing countries because PEs become
profitable without losing their social objective. In sum,
the change of ownership is not enough to produce better
managed PEs.
To Adam, Cavendish and Mistry, privatization is not
superior to public ownership.23 They affirm that the sale of
the asset itself does not necessarily generate any effect.24
Furthermore, they reject that:
The difference in enterprise performance under
public and private ownership are necessarily
intrinsic. Instead, they assert that observed
performance differences between private and
22Alex Danso, “Privatization of State Owned Enterprises
in Africa: The Case of Ghana:” Southern Political Review XX,
no. 2 (Fall 1992) : 351—352.
23Christopher Adam, William Cavendish, and Percy S.
Mistry, Adjusting Privatization: Case Studies from
Developing Countries (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational
Books, Inc., 1992), 12.
24Ibid., 9.
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public ownership are a reflection of
differences in the observe functions of
different owners, and in the principal—
agent relationships between assets owners
and managers.25
Finally, they stipulate that privatization should not be
regarded as a panacea to solve problems in developing
countries.26 They note that privatization cannot be
transferred from the developed countries to the developing
countries, but it should be adapted to its context.27
Finally, these authors recognize that if divestiture is
effected through private sales, there will generally be a
concentration of equity of wealth.28 This is the contention
that the researcher’s study will shed light on.
a. Pricing in PEs
According to Kent, the services provided by the public
sector are underpriced because the bureaucrats use them to
gain public support for the provision of these services.29





29Calvin A. Kent, “Privatization of Public Functions:
Promises and Problems, “ in Entrepreneurship and the
Privatizing of Government, ed. Calvin A. Kent (Wesport,
Connecticut: Greewood Press, Inc., 1987), 10.
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services such as garbage collection, water, sewage,
electricity, and transportation. Besides this political
reason for pricing, Kent identifies two economic reasons for
underpricing related to PEs. First, the PEs do not determine
their price based on their cost of capital (interest and
depreciation) ~30 The price that most of the PEs charge for
their services does not reflect the cost that they have
incurred to produce them. This is because most of the PEs
rely on national policy to determine their prices, and not
on the desire to be profitable. Second, there is a lack of
competitive pricing to use as a benchmark in most of the
sectors in which the PEs are involved.3’ Most of the time
the PE5 operate in sectors where they have a monopoly. These
factors lead PEs to price their services below their market
value.32 To avoid underpricing, the workshop report on
privatization suggests that the PE5 must formulate their
pricing policy by combining the concern for the national







After reviewing the various definitions of
privatization, the writer defines specifically what is
privatization in this study. Also, the constraints and the
forms of privatization are discussed.
1. Privptizptipn Defined
Although some variances exist in the definition of
privatization, there is in the literature a broad and
general conception of the term.’ Generally, the shared
belief is twofold: one argues that the public sector is too
large for the state to be monopolizing it; and that some of
the functions that have been performed by the public sector
might be better performed by the private sector.2 Here the
public sector refers to activities that fall under the
operation of organizations that are serving entirely public
‘Rashdan, 33.
2Ronald C. Moe, “Exploring the Limit of Privatization,”




goals while the private sector denotes organizations whose
activities are entirely profit oriented.3 However Willig and
Shapiro indicate that this distinction is somewhat
artificial since private companies can be regulated in a way
that they will pursue public goals.4
Privatization also alludes to a variety of policies for
turning over the delivery and/or the production of public
services and goods to the private sector.5 Privatization as
it is defined by Ernst & Young reflects the idea of the
transfer of the state’s activities to the private sector.6
This definition applies to joint public-private ventures,
concessions, leases, management contracts, and also to
built-own-operate-and-transfer (BOOT) agreements .“ Cook and
Kirkpatrick identify three main definitions of
privatization: a change in the ownership of the PE,
liberalization or deregulation, and the transfer of goods
and services from the public to private sector while the
3Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig, Economic Rationales
for the Scope of Privatization, eds. Elizabeth E. Bailey and




6Ernst and Young, 4.
7lbid.
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government holds the responsibility for supplying the
service.8 As a variant, Campbell White and Bhatia define
privatization as the transmission of operational control of
an enterprise from the government to the private sector.9
For Butler, privatization is simply the shifting of a
function, either in whole or in part, from the public to the
private sector.’° Horn distinguishes between two concepts of
privatization; while one of the concepts alludes to a
strategy for shrinking government, the other refers to the
use of private organizations to manage and deliver public
programs.” Hanke agrees by pointing out that privatization
is the transfer of assets and service functions from public
to private hands.’2
Vernon contends that a number of observers perceive
8Cook and Kirkpatrick, 3 - 4.
9Oliver Campbell White and Anita Bhatia, Privatization
in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1998), 10.
10Stuart Butler, “Privatization for Public Purposes,” in
Privatization and its Alternatives, ed. William T. Gormley,
Jr. (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1991), 17.
‘1Carl E. Van Horn, “The Myth and Realities of
Privatization,” in Privatization and Its Alternatives, ed.
Williams T. Gormley, Jr. (Madison, Wisconsin: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 261.
‘2Steve H. Hanke, 4.
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privatization as any loosening of government control.’3
Savas similarly states that privatization occurs when the
activities or ownership of assets of the government
decrease, or those of the private sector expand.’4
Concurring with this definition, Guislain defines
privatization as any action leading to the change in control
or ownership over assets or~ Callaghy and Wilson
III define privatization in a broader and restrictive sense.
They narrowly defined privatization as any endeavor
eliminating or diluting government equity ownership or
management control of an enterprise.’6 However, they broadly
designate privatization as the prelude of greater market
rationality or competitiveness into a sphere of economic
activity.’7 Analyzing privatization in transition economies,
Goldstein and Gultekin believe that privatization is any
‘3Vernon, 2.
14Savas, 3.
‘5Pierre Guislain, Divestiture of State Enterprises: An
overview of the Legal Framework, World Bank Technical Paper
no. 186.
16Thomas M. Callaghy, and Ernest J. Wilson III, “Africa:
Policy, Reality or Ritual ?“ in The Promise of
Privatization: A Challençe for U.S. Policy, ed. Raymond




initiative taken to change the way raw materials are
converted into consumer goods.’8 Goldstein and Gultekin
reached that conclusion because in transition economies, the
state most often owns the raw materials of the country.
Taking a broader view, Suleiman and Waterbury explain that
privatization is the change in ownership of assets from
public to private.’9 Ramanadham argues that there are two
approaches to defining privatization. One consists in
describing it from contending perspectives and the other to
the action taken in privatizing, therefore normative and
process driven approach.2° Either way represents the
marketization of enterprise operation through three options:
ownership changes, organizational changes, and operational
changes.2’ Rashdan points out that any definition of
privatization without taking into account its deregulation
aspect will be inadequate for its implementation.22
‘8Michael A. Goldstein and N. Bulent Gultekin,
“Privatization in Post-Communist Economies,” in ~‘j~
Financial Sector Reform and Privatization in Transition
Economies, ed. John Doukas (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
B.V., 1998), 286.
‘9Suleiman and Waterbury, 4.
2O~ V. Ramanadham, Constraints and Impacts of




The underlying idea on the above definitions of
privatization reflects transferring the activities or
ownership of the state to the private sector.
For the purpose of this study, the definition of
privatization closely follows the views broadly held by the
general consensus. It is defined as a process of
transferring assets from the public to the private sector.23
This definition encompasses the joint venture between public
and private sectors.24
2. Constraints to Privatization
In order to implement privatization, government has to
deal with its constraints. The constraints for privatization
can be subdivided under four headings: legal; monetary;
infra structural; and informational.
Many countries have restrictive laws concerning the
influx of foreign capital.25 These laws have to be amended
for the success of privatization.
Another constraint to privatization is the lack of






This creates a perceived fear of privatized monopolies.27
Further, the laws dealing with privatization are restrictive
in developing centralized planned economies particularly
when these laws refer to the overall laws on privatization;
sectoral or specific enterprise privatization; employee
buyouts, claims, and the utilization of divestiture
proceeds 28
The lack of a well—developed capital market constitutes
a constraint for privatization.29 In effect, the weakness of
the capital market leads to the private sales of public
enterprises. The underdeveloped capital market accounts for
the lack of indigenous people to be in a position to buy
PEs. Even when a stock exchange exists, in some countries it
is not developed well enough to support the need for capital
that privatization demands. Côte d’Ivoire has been lucky on
that front because a stock market was created in 1976. Since
its creation its managers gained some valuable insight
concerning its operation and activities.





The more developed the infrastructure, the more
privatization will attract foreign investments.30 Therefore,
the lack of transportation, telephone, electricity, water,
and communications will be a constraint for privatization.
Finally, effective privatization requires well
developed financial information about the PE5 to be sold
off. This permits the buyers to make a fair assessment of
their acquisition.31 Often, the accounts of the PEs to be
privatized are in arrears; their revenue and their cost
figures are so distorted that it is difficult to assess
their financial balance; their book value most of the time
does not reflect their true position; lastly, estimates
earnings are extremely fuzzy because economic policies,
prices and wages, technological changes, and employment
environment are extremely difficult to predict.32
Privatization will be difficult to implement in places where
unemployment is high and rising, industrial output is
decreasing, inflation persists, the repayment of debt is






3. Forms of Privatizptjpn
The same techniques for privatization are utilized in
developing and developed countries. Dinavo identifies eight
of them: contracting out; voucher; sales of assets by the
government to the private sector: joint venture; subsidies;
load-shedding; private payment; management privatization;
and liberalization or deregulation.
Regarding contracting out as a mode of privatization, a
private firm provides the service but the government holds
its funding responsibility.34 This technique is widely used
in the United States.35 This method of privatization is also
employed intensively in developing countries where the
government owns certain activities and the private sector is
involved in the provision of the goods and services.36
Vouchers are grants given by the government to allow
certain individuals to purchase specific goods or
services.37 This permits some citizen to buy some goods and







This form of privatization is not often used in developing
countries ~
Sales of assets or equity (including joint venture) are
a method of privatization involving the transfer of
ownership of assets from the public sector to the private
sector.4° It is called divestiture. In this form of
privatization the government can sale part or all the
company.4’ This form of privatization is easier to implement
in developed countries than in a developing one. This is due
to the fact that the capital markets are not as well
developed in developing countries as they are in a developed
one 42
A subsidy is a form of privatization in which the
government provides some financial assistance to the private
sector to buy or provide certain goods or services.43 This









However, Dinavo recommends that this method of privatization
should be avoided in developing countries because it drains
the government’s money.45
Load—shedding is a method of privatization that takes
place when the government withdraws from the provision of
goods and services to allow the private sector to get
involved.46 This takes place most of the time when the
government is not efficient in providing the goods and
services. Although the government has withdrawn from
providing these goods and services, it can still remain as
facilitator and regulator of the service.47
Private payment is yet another form of privatization.
The government still provides the service but a user fee is
paid by the recipients. While the provision of the service
takes place in the public sector, its financing occurs in
the private sector.48 Dinavo indicates that this technique
for privatization should not be recommended for developing








Liberalization or deregulation form of privatization
permits the private sector to enter into certain activities
that were monopolized by the public sector.5° This method of
privatization is directed at increasing competition by
allowing private companies to provide goods or services that
were once the privilege of the public sector.5’
Management privatization is in most cases a type of
privatization where government offers to the private sector
the management of a particular PE while it is still
maintaining its control.52 According to Dinavo, this
technique of privatization should be used often in the
developing countries because the private sector has more
expertise and know—how in a particular industry than the







As stated earlier, the methodology used to explore
whether privatization of Public Enterprises (PEs) has
broadened participation of the population in the economy of
Côte d’Ivoire is exploratory. As such, it uses descriptive
statistical data to quantify, develop, and analyze the flow
of shares from the public sector to the private sector. This
flow helps one to measure the three indicators that the
writer identified, revealing in the process whether a
concentration of the state’s shares in the private sector
exists or not. To this end, nine tables and eighteen pie
charts were developed herein. The calculations performed to
develop these tables and pie charts are presented in
appendixes A, B, C, D, and E. Each table focuses on a given
privatized PE. The calculation for the nine tables are done
in 1995 CFAF. These nine corporations are: FILTISSAC, SMB,
SHELL—Cl, SIFAL, SOGB, SAPH, SICOR, SICABLE, and ELF OIL-Cl.
Each table therefore shows the flow of shares (expressed in
1995 CFA francs) from the state to the private sector and
identifies the beneficiaries of such transfers.
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Each table also indicates whether privatized PE5 increased
or decreased their market value because of privatization.
The construction, development, analysis of these tables
point out clearly whether the state has indeed significantly
retracted economically from the public sector to make room
for a broader spectrum of non state access in the economy. A
quick note is important here. Four privatized PEs, between
1994 and 1995, among the thirteen privatized PE5 are not
included in the study: CAl (Complex Agro-Industrielle de
Sinematiali), CAl Anguélédougou (Complexe Agro-Industrielle
d’Anguélédougou), Complexe Sucrier de Maradiassa and Société
Ivoirienne de Chemin de Fer (SICF) . They were excluded
because they are non-corporate entities with insufficient
publicly available data for analysis.
A. Valuation of Privatized PE5
Tables one introduces the privatization of FILTISSAC
(Bay Spinning Mill and Weaving Company). Before
Privatization (BP), FILTISSAC was valued at CFAF 2.1 billion
and after privatization (AP) its value is CFAF 2.5 billion.
How did FILTISSAC increase its value after privatization?
The shareholders of FILTISSAC before privatization were the
Agha Khan Fund, State, IPS, other privates, and the stock
market. The state after privatization has decreased its
110
presence in the economy by selling CFAF 516 million worth of
its shares to the stock market. These state’s shares sold on
the stock market have amounted to CFAF 903 million which
translated to an increase in value of CFAF 387 million. This
explains why FILTISSAC increased its worth from CFAF 2.1
billion to CFAF 2.5 billion.
Table 1
Flow of state’s shares to the private sector


































* : Before Privatization
**: After Privatization
***: Bay Spinning Mill and Weaving Company
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique













state’s shares to the private
FILTISSAC)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’ An 2000,” Jeune
Afrique Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996,
140.
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Table two shows the privatization of SMB (Société
Multinational de Bitumes). Before privatization, SMB was
valued at CFAF 1.2 billion. After privatization, SMB shot up
to CFAF 3.3 billion an increase in value because the state
sold CFAF 612 million worth of its shares totaling in








***: (Société Multinational de bitumes)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique
Economie, hors sdrie, Janvier 1996, 141.
Table 2
Flow of the state’s shares to the private
sector (estimate in millions of 1995 CFAF)
59* AP**
SMB*** 1,200 3,388
Shareholders Value of shares Value of shares Change value of














Fig.2, Flow of State’s shares to





Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique





Table three presents Shell-Cl. It was valued st CFAF 1.8
billion before privatization. It now has a value of CFAF 2.9
billion after privatization. The increase after
privatization of the value of Shell-Cl was due to the sale
of CFAF 540 million worth of the state’s shares during
privatization. This transaction was valued at CFAF 1.1
billion with CFAF 806 million going to Shell International
and CFAF 921 million going to the stock market.
Table 3
Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector
(estimate I millions of 1995 CFAF)
Bp* AP**
Shell~CI*** 1,800 2,987.999,999.4
Shareholders Value of Value of shares Change value of
shares hold hold shares hold
State 900 360 (540)
Shell 900 1,706.400,000 806.400,000
International
Stock market 921.599,999,4 921.599,999,4




Source: “Côte d’Ivoire cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique













shares to the private sector
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire
Economie, hors
Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique




SIFAL (Société Ivoirienne de Fabrication de Lubrifiants)
figures are displayed in table four. Before privatization
SIFAL was valued at CFAF 140 million but after privatization
it was worth CFAF 356 million, SIFAL increased its value by
selling CFAF 28 million worth of its shares. Shell-Cl bought
CFAF 205 million worth of SIFAL’s shares, Mobil-Cl bought
CFAF 7 million worth of these shares, and SIFAL’s personnel
bought CFAF 31 million of these shares.
Table 4
Flow of state’s shares to the private sector
(estimate in millions 1995 CFAF)
5~D* AP**
SIFAL*** 140 356.3
Shareholders Value of shares Value of Shares Change value of
hold hold shares hold
State 42 14 (28)
Shell-Cl 28 233.66 205.66
Elf Oil-Cl 28 28 0
Total-Cl 21 21 0
Mobil-Cl 21 28 7
Personnel 31.64 31.64
Total 140 356.3 216.3
*: Before Privatization
**: After Privatization
‘~: (5ociété Ivoirienne de Fabrication de Lubrifiants)
Source: “COte d’Ivoire cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique Economie, hors












Fig. 4, Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector (PB,
SI FAL)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000, “ Jeune Afrique
Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996, 141.
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Table five indicates that the value of SOGB (Société de
Caoutchoucs de Grand Béréby) before privatization was CFAF
21 billion and after privatization it became worth CFAF 19
billion. SOGB’s decrease in value after privatization is
attributed to the selling of CFAF 12.6 billion worth of its
shares to Bereby finance for CFAF 11 billion.
Table 5
Flow of State’s Shares to the private sector
(estimate in millions cFAF)
BP* AP**
SOGB*** 21,000 19,400
Shareholders Value of shares Value of shares Change value of











*: Sociétd de Caoutchoucs de Grand Bdrdby
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique Economie, hors










~ Bereby finance ~
Fig.5, Flow of state’s shares to the private sector
(PE, SOGB)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000, “Jeune Afrique
Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996, 141.
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Table six reveals that SAPH (Soc±été Africaine de Plantation
d’Hévéas) had a value of CFAF 13.9 billion (BP) before
privatization, and CFAF 12.9 (AP) after privatization. The
state sold CFAF 6.9 billion worth of its shares to OCTIDE at
5.8 billion.
Table 6
Flow of state’s shares to the private sector
(estimate in millions of 1995 CFAF)
BP* AP**
SAPH*** 13,998.508,576 12,910.479,880.97
Shareholders Value of shares Value of shares Change value of
hold hold shares hold
State 7,735.575,839.1 773.557,583.91 (6,962.018,255.19)
SIPH 4,952.672,334.19 4,952.672,334.19 0
CFD 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0
CDC 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0
DEG 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0
Other 113.387,919.47 113.387,919.47 0
privates
OCTIDE 5,873.989,560.16 5,873.989,560.16
Total 13,998.508,576 12,910,479,88.97 (1,088.028,695.03)
*. Before Privatization
**: After Privatization
***: Sociétd Africaine de Plantation d’Hévdas
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique Economie, hors




Fig.6, Flow of state’s shares to the private sector
(in percentage; PE, SAPH)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique

















Table seven introduces SICOR (Société Ivoirienne de Coco
Râpé). SICOR was valued at CFAF 538 million before
privatization while after privatization it reached CFAF
billion. SICOR increased its value by selling CFAF 274
million worth of its shares to the stock market for CFAF
1.3 billion.
Table 7
Flow of state’s shares to the private sector
(estimate in millions of 1995 cFAF)
~p* AP**
SICOR*** 538.404,176 1,625.980,611.52
Shareholders Value of shares Value of shares Change value of
hold hold shares hold
State 274.586,129.76 0 (274.586,130
Other privates 107.680,835.2 107.680,835.2 0
COFINCI 80.760,626.40 80.760,626.40 0







***:Société Ivoirienne de Coco Râpë
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An
série, Janvier 1996, 141.
1.6
2000,” Jeune Afrique Economie, hors
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Before Privatization After Privatization
State 51% State 0%
54%
State Other privates ~ Cofinci
~ BEI Stock market
Fig.7, Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector (PE,
SICOR)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique
Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996, 141.
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Table eight presents SICABLE (Société Ivoirienne de Cables)
Before privatization SICABLE was valued at CFAF 597 million
but after privatization it became worth CFAF 1.1 billion.
This increase in the value of SICABLE is attributed to the
sale of CFAF 209 million worth of its shares to the stock
market at a value of CFAF 808 million.
Table 8
Flow of state’s shares to the private sector









***: Sociét~ Ivoirienne de cable
Source: “COte d’Ivoire Cap Sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique








Value of shares Change value of











~ SIDELAF Stock market
After Privatization
State 0%
Fig.8, Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector
(In percentage; PE, SICABLE)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique
Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996, 141.
Ivoiral
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Table nine shows how Elf Oil-Cl increased its value from CFAF
510 million to CFAF 1.6 billion after privatization. Elf OIL
CI increased its value by selling CFAF 153 million worth of
its shares to Elf Oil-Africa and the stock market. The
state’s shares sold to Elf Oil-Africa were valued at CFAF 593
million while those sold on the stock market were valued at
CFAF 678 million.
BP* AP**
ELF Oil_CI*** 510 1,629
Shareholders Value of shares Value of shares Change value of













***: Elf OIL-Côte d’Ivoire
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique Economie, hors
série, Janvier 1996, 141.
Table 9
Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector










~ Other privates ~ Stock market
Fig.9, Flow of the state’s shares to the private sector
(in percentage; PE, Elf Oil-Cl)
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrique




The researcher acknowledges that the personnel owns
some shares only in one of the companies (SIFAL) that have
been privatized. This suggests that the state did not
promote the broadening of ownership of assets by
distributing the shares of the privatized Pes to their
personnel. In addition, one notes that the state has
withdrawn completely from three companies; FILTISSAC, SICOR
and SICABLE. The companies from which the state has
withdrawn are in the following sectors of the economy:
spinning and weaving, coconuts, and cables. The writer
remarks also that the state still owns shares in six
privatized PEs: Elf OIL-Cl, Shell-Cl, SIFAL, SOOB, SAPH, and
SMB. These privatized PEs are involved respectively in the
production of oil, rubber and asphalt. These sectors in
which the state did not withdraw completely are vital as
economic engines of the country. Oil is indispensable for
vehicles to run and move people and merchandise from one
region of the country to the other. It is also used as fuel
or energy to operate factories and light up cities and
houses. As for asphalt, it is instrumental in developing the
needed infrastructure of the country. In other words,
asphalt facilitates the building of roads to connect
regions. This is the basis for commerce, communication and
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mobility of people. Rubber on the other hand is used in the
production of countless products such as bottles, tires,
etc. Rubber is considered one of the major exports of Côte
d’Ivoire and most of the rubber produced is exported. For
instance, in 1994 Côte d’Ivoire produced 83 thousand metric
tons of rubber and exported 76 thousand metric tons.’
Although the writer indicates that the state is still
present in the vital sectors mentioned earlier, one also
notes that the state has made a great effort to withdraw
from the economy. In effect, the author observes that while
the state owned about 92 percent of SMB’s shares before
privatization, it owns only 15 percent of the shares of that
company after privatization. This kind of massive withdrawal
of the state is noticed in all the companies that the writer
mentioned above (Elf OIL-CT, SOGB, SIFAL, SHELL-Cl, SMB and
SAPH) . This state withdrawal indicates that there is at
least a genuine effort put forward by the state to withdraw
from the economy to make room for the private sector.
The writer also observes that the stock market has been
utilized five out of nine times to distribute the shares of
the following privatized PEs: FILTISSAC, SHELL-Cl, SICOR,
SICABLE, and ELF OIL-Cl. This reveals that the stock market
‘~‘Côte d’Ivoire: Production and Exports of Cash Crops,
1989-95.” IMF Staff Country Report No.96/135 (December
1996) : 15.
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has been utilized in the privatization program which
indicates that the state has been making an effort to
broaden ownership. However, the above analysis does not give
a clear picture of the withdrawal of the state nor does it
gives us a clear indication that there is a definite
broadening of ownership of assets of privatized PE5. In
order to get a clear assessment of the statement stated
earlier, one has to analyze systematically the value of the
shares of the privatized PE5. Thus, the researcher undertook
the case study of Côte d’Ivoire that he presented in chapter
1. In effect, in the case study the writer developed six
tables that give a definitive answer regarding the
broadening of ownership of assets of PE5 in Côte d’Ivoire.
To reach this conclusion, first the writer indicated how
privatization has contributed to the economy by comparing
the value of the shares owned by the state before and after
the advent of privatization. Similarly it allowed one to
observe how the state’s withdrawal has contributed to the
apparition of “new economic operators” that became “new
owners” of the state’s shares. As a result, the researcher
identified the value of the shares that the state still
controls and indicated the industries in which it has a
strong hold. Lastly, the value of the state’s shares
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transferred to the private sector indicated the broadening
of assets of privatized PEs.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS
This dissertation was undertaken to explore whether or
not the privatization of Public Enterprises (PEs) in
developing countries led to the concentration of shares of
privatized PEs in the hands of a few. In cases where a
concentration occurred, it was postulated that it could be
counter productive to the broadening of asset ownership with
a popular base needed for the development of developing
countries.
The methodology used in this work was exploratory in
nature. However, three indicators were used in gauging the
existence of the broadening of ownership of assets of
privatized PEs: the importance of the stock market was
indicated by comparing the value of the stock market to that
of the total shares of the privatized PEs; the prominence of
the employees’ ownership shares of the privatized PEs was
measured by comparing the total value of employees’
ownership shares to that of the total shares of the
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privatized PEs; the prominence of the state’s ownership
after privatization was identified by comparing the value of
the state’s ownership shares to that of the total shares of
the privatized PEs.
The case of Côte d’Ivoire revealed that when developing
countries are embarking into privatization they have to pay
attention to the disparity which already exists in the
country. If not, it could lead to the concentration of
assets of privatized PEs. To avoid this, actions should be
taken specifically by the government to broaden ownership of
assets. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the researcher found
that although the state has withdrawn somewhat, it still has
a relatively strong presence in the economy. The findings
pointed out that most of the privatized PE5 are in the hands
of a mutual fund or a holding company that had the capacity
to raise an enormous amount of capital. The findings also
indicated that in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, companies that
have a network in place with the government are in a better
position to buy the privatized PE5’ shares.
Although this dissertation set out to analyze the
broadening of assets of public enterprises in developing
countries, it was limited in its analysis. As discussed the
methodology and contextual difficulties encountered in field
work other data collection, data—review and data-analysis
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led the study to focus on the theoretical and normative
discourses on equity and development in privatization.
Thus, to indicate how privatization must be carefully
analyzed for its effective implementation, it was viewed in
the larger context. This approach revealed that although
privatization has been adopted in different contexts in
developed and developing countries, it was pursued for the
same motives in the two camps. It also pointed out that the
issue of equity is as important as that of efficiency when
privatizing.
In addition, the literature reviewed introduces the
debate regarding privatization. On one hand, privatization
promoters emphasize its efficiency aspect; while on the
other hand, other authors bring to the forefront issues such
as equity that must be addressed in order for privatization
to succeed.
An orientation for future research could be to use the
indicators developed herein to undertake a study comprising
the privatization program from 1990 to 1997 with the 69
Ivorian companies privatized during that period. One should
note here that the study should be undertaken with a view to
indicate how the different sectors of the economy have been
affected by privatization. This orientation is necessary due
to the obstacles described in this study. In addition, such
a study could show how the population at large, mostly in
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the rural areas, could be associated with such a venture to






FILTI5SAC C value in millions CFAF 1995)
BP* AP**




Share Percentage Value of Value of shares (÷, —) New percentage
Holders (Decimal) shares hold hold (Decimal)
Agha 36 757.381,5 757.381,5 0 30
Khan (0.3581) (0.3027)
Fund
State 24 516.271,5 -516.271,5 0
(0. 2441)
IPS 10 211.5 211.5 0 9
(0.1) (0.0845)
Other 30 629.847 629.847 0 25
Privates (0.2978) (0.2517)
Stock 903.56 903.56 36
Market (0.3611)





Ci-,-) respectively increase, decrease value.
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur PAn 2000,” Jeune Africzue Economie,
hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 140.
APPENDIX A (continued)
TABLE 2
CAl ANGt3EDEDQtJ (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
BP* AP**












Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Africrue Economie,
hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 141.
TABLE 3
CAl CINEMATIALI (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
BP* AP**
Value of SE not a corporate 250
(CAl entity
CINEMATIALI)








Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrigue Economie, hors





SMB (value in millions in 1995 CFAF)
BP* AP**
Value of 1,200 3,387.999,999.9
PE (SMB)
Share— Percentage Value of Value of (+, —) New
holders (Decimal) shares hold shares percentage
hold (Decimal)
State 92 1,103.4 491.4 —612 15
(0.9195) (0.1450)
SIR 2 27.48 2,827.48 2,800 83
(0.0229) (0.8346)
Shell—Cl 6 68.88 68.88 0 2
(0.0574) (0.0203)
Other 0 .24 .24 0 0
privates (0.0002) (0.00007)




***: rounded number to gain space.
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Africue Economie,
hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 141.
Calculation of the transfer of the state for SMB
SIR State Total
Percentage of 51 40.95 91.95
transfer given (.51) (.4095) (.9195)
(decimal)
Value of the 612,000,000 491,400,000 1,103,400,000
transfer given
Percentage 55 .45 100









SHELL1-CI (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
BP~ AP~4
Value of PE 1,800 2,987.999,999.4
(Shell—Cl)
Share— Percentage Value of Value of shares (4-, -) New percentage
holders shares hold hold
State 50 900 360 —540 20
(0.5) (0.2)
Shell 50 900 1,706.400,000 806.400,000 64
Interna— (0.5) -. (0.64)
t I ona 1
Stock 921,599,999.4 921,599,999.4 16
market (0.16)




Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,”





Calculation of the transfer of state’s shares for Shell—Cl
1) State Others Total
Percentage 20 30 50
(decimal) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5)
transfer given
Percentage 40 60 100




Value of the 360,000,000 540,000,000 900,000,000
transfer
2) Stock market Shell Total
International
Percentage 16 14 30
(Decimal) (0.16) (0.14) (0.3)
transfer
given
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s shares
for Shell—Cl (continued)
2) Stock market Shell Total
International
Percentage 53 47 100







Value of the 287,999,999.8 252,000,000.2 540,000,000
transfer





SIFAL (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
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BP* AP**
Value of PE 140 356.300,000
( SI FAL)
Share Percentage Value of Value of (+,—) New
holders (decimal) shares shares percentage
hold hold (decimal)
State 30 42 14 —28 4
(0.3) (0.04)
Shell—Cl 20 28 233.66 205.66 65***
(0.2) (0.66)
Elf oil—Cl 20 28 28 0 8
(0.2) (0.08)
Total—Cl 15 21 21 0 6
(0.15) (0.06)
Mobil—Cl 15 21 28 7 8
(0.15) (0.08)
Personnel 31.64 31.64 9
(0.09)




‘~‘~: number rounded down to get 100%.
Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune
série, Janvier 1996, p. 141.
Afripue Economie, hors
Appendix A (continued)
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s share for SIFAL
1) State Others Total
Percentage 10 20 30
(decimal) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3)
transfer given
Percentage 33 67 100





Value of the 14,000,000 28,000,000 42,000,000
transfer
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s
shares for Shell-Cl (continued)
2) Shell-Cl Mobil-Cl Personal Total
Percentage 13 5 2 20
(decimal) (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) (0.2)
trans fer
given
Percentage 65 25 10 100






Value of 18,200,000 7,000,000 2,800,000 2,800,000
the
transfer







50GB (value in in millions of 1995 CEAF)
pp* AP*
Value of PE 21,000 19,400
( S 0GB)
Share— Percentage Value of Value of (+, —) New
holders (Decimal) shares shares percentage
hold hold
State 95 19,914.3 7,314.3 —12,600 38
(0.9483) (0.3770)
Nichelin 5 1,085.7 1,085.7 0 5
(0.0517) (0.0559)
Bereby 11,000 11,000 57
finance (0.5670)




Source: “COte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune ~rj~ue ~conomie,
hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 141.
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s shares for 50GB
1) State Bereby finance Total
Percentage 35 60 95
(decimal) (0.3483) (0.6) (0.9483)
transfer given
Percentage 37 63 100




Value of the 7,314,300,000 12,600,000,000 19,914,300,000
transfer





SAPH (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
. BP* AP**
Value of PE 13,998.508,576 12,910.479,880,97
(SAPH)
Share Percentage Value of shares Value of shares (÷,-) New percentage
holders (Decimal) hold hold (Decimal)
State 55 7,735.575,839.10 773.557,583.91 6,962.018,255.19 6
(0.5526) (0.06)
SIPH 35 4,952.672,334.19 4,952.672,334.19 0 38
(0.3538) (0.38)
CFD 3 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0 3
(0.0285) (0.03)
CDC 3 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0 3
(0.0285) (0.03)
DEG 3 398.957,494.42 398.957,494.42 0 3
(0.0285) (0.03)
Other 1 113.387,919.47 113.387,919.47 0 1
privates (0.0081) (0.01)
Octide 5,873.989,560.16 5,873.989,560.16 46
(0. 46)




Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrigue Economie, hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 140.
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Appendix A (continued)
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s share for SASH
1) State Octide Total
Percentage 45 10 55
(decimal) (0.4526) (0.1) (0.5526)
transfer given
Percentage 82 18 100





Value of the 5,883,799,998 1,300,000,002 7,183,800,000
trans fer




SICOR (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
• BP* AP**
Value of 538.404,176 1,625.980,611.52
PE
(SICOR)
Share Percentage Value of Value of shares (+, -) New percentage
holders (Decimal) shares hold hold (decimal)
State 51 274.586,129.76 -274.586,129.76 0
(0. 51)
Other 20 107.680,835.2 107,680,835.2 0 6
privates (0.2) (0.06)
Cofinci 15 80.760,626.4 80.760,626.4 0 5
(0.15) (0.05)
BEI 14 75.376,584.64 75.376,584.64 0 5
(0.14) (0.05)
Stock 1,362.162,565.28 1,362.162,565.28 84
market (0.84)




Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,”




of the transfer of the state’s shares for SICOR
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1) State Stock market Total












Value of 0 255,000,000 255,000,000
the
trans fer






SICABLE (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
BP* AP**
Value of PE 597.628,635.36 1,197.249,366.17
(SICABLE)
Share Percentage Value of shares Value of shares (+, -) New
holders (Decimal) hold hold percentage
(decimal)
State 35 209.170,022.38 -209.170,022.38 0
(0.35)
Pirelli 51 304.790,604.03 304.790,604.03 0 25
(0.51) (0.25)
Ivoiral 9 53.786,577 53.786,577 0 4
(0.09) (0.04)
SIDELAF 5 29.881,431.77 29.881,431.77 0 3
(0.05) (0.03)
Stock 808.790,753.19 808.790,753.19 68
Market (0.68)




Source: “Côte d’Ivoire Cap sur 1’An 2000,” Jeune Africiue Economie,
hors série, Janvier 1996, p. 141.
Appendix A (continued)
Calculation of the transfer of the state’s shares for SICABLE
1) State Stock market Total
Percentage 0 35 35
(decimal) (0.35) (0.35)
transfer given
Percentage 0 100 100




Value of the 0 194,250,000 194,250,000
transfer





Maradiassa Sugar Complex (value in millions of 1995 CFAF)
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5p* AP**
Value of BE not a corporate 800,000,000
(Maradiassa entity
Sugar Complex)




Total 100 86L446,681.6 100
*: Before Privatization.
**: After Privatization.
Source: “COte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’An 2000,” Jeune Afrigue





Elf Oil—Cl (value in millions 1995 CEAE)
BP* AP**
Value of 510 1,629
PE (Elf
Oil—Cl)
Share— Percentage Value of Value of (+, —) New
holders (Decimal) shares hold shares hold percentage
(decimal)
State 50 255 102.000,000 —153 6
(0.5) (0.06)
Elf Oil— 50 254.796,000 848.396,000 593.6 52
Africa (0.4996) (0.52)
Other 0 .204 .204 0 0
privates (0.0004) (0.0004)
Stock 678.4 678.4 42
market (0.42)




Source: “COte d’Ivoire Cap sur l’~_ri 2000,” Jeune Afrigue Economic,




Calculation of the transfer of the state’s shares for Elf Oil—Cl
1) State Others Total
Percentage 20 30 50
(decimal) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5)
transfer given
Percentage 40 60 100




Value of the 102,000,000 153,000,000 255,000,000
trans fer
2) Stock Market Elf Oil-Cl Total
Percentage 16 14 30
(decimal) (0.16) (0.14) (0.3)
transfer given
Percentage 53 47 100
derived from the (0.533333333) (0.466666667) (1)
percentage
transfer given
Value of the 81,600,000 71,400,000 153,000,000
trans fer





Contribution of privatized PE5 before and after
privatization (in 1995 CFAF)
(PE, BP**) (PE/GDP****, BP) (PE, AP***) (PE/GDP, AP)
FILTISSAC 2,115,000,000 0.004240176 2,502,288,500 0.005016617
SMB 1,200,000,000 0.002405774 3,387,999,999.9 0.006792302
Shell-Cl 1,800,000,000 0.003608661 2,987,999,999.4 0.0059900377
SIFAL 140,000,000 0.000280674 356,300,000.00 0.000714314
50GB 21,000,000,000 0.042101043 19,400,000,000 0.038893344
SAPH 13,998,508,576 0.028064372 12,910,479,880.97 0.025883079
SICOR 538,404,176 0.001079399 1,625,980,611.52 0.003259785
SICABLE 597,628,635.36 0.001198133 1,197,249,366.17 0.002400259
Elf Oil-Cl 510,000,000 0.001022454 1,629,000,000 0.003265838
Total 41,899,541,387.36 0.084000684 45,997,298,357.96 0.092215915




7, 8, 9, 10, and 12.
Note: GDP of Côte d’Ivoire in 1995 is FF 4,988,000,000. It was converted
in CFAF by taking as an exchange rate FF 1 = CFAF 100.





Breakdown of the value of the PBs privatized for the state
(in 1995 CFAF)
Organizations in which State, BP* State, AP**










Elf Oil-Cl 255,000,000 102,000,000
Total value of the 30,950,303,491.24 9,055,257,583.81
state ownership
Total state/GDP 0.062049526 0.018154085
*: Before Privatization.
**: After Privatization.




Breakdown of the value of the PEs privatized according to the
institutions or organizations owning some shares in these PBs, for
Before Privatization (BP), and After Privatization CAP)
Institutions and Non state, BP* Non state, AP**
organizations owning
some shares in the PBs
privati zed
Agha khan fund 757,381,500 757,381,500
IPS 211,500,000 211,500,000




Other privates 240,000 240,000
Shell International 900,000,000 1,706,400,000
Stock market 921,599,999.4
Shell—Cl 28,000,000 233,660,000













Breakdown of the value of the PEs privatized according
to the institutions or organizations owning some shares in
these PEs; for Before Privatization (BP), and After Privatization
(In 1995 CEAF)






Other privates 113,387,919.47 113,387,919.47
Octide 5,873,989,560.16








Elf Oil—Africa 254,796,000.00 848,396,000













Summation of of the value of shareholders
shares that appeared more than one time after
privatization in TABLE 15(in 000s 1995 CFAF)
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Total 4,674,513.317,87 851,359.754,67 2,008,940 876,396
Shell corresponds here either to Shell International or
because they represent the group Shell.





Value of the Shares Owned by the State
and Organizations After Privatization (in 1995 CEAF)
Shareholders Value of the shares own by the
state and non—state AP**
State 9,055,257,583.81






















Value of Shares Owned by the State
and Organizations After Privatization
(in 1995 CEAF)
Shareholders Value of the shares of the share













Classification of the Shareholders by Ascending
Order of their Shares Value Owned After Privatization
(in 1995 CEAF)
Shareholders arranged in Value of the shares own by the




















Note: TABLE 18 derived from TABLE 17.
APPENDIX E (continued)
TABLE 18 (continued)
Classification of share holders by acsending
order of their shares value owned after privatization
(in 1995 CFAE)
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Shareholders arranged in Value of the shares own by the












by Ascending Order of their Percentage Value
of shares Own after Privatization (in 1995 CFAF)
Note: TABLE 19 derived from TABLE 18.
(1) is obtained by deviding each shareholder shares value
and TABLE 18 continued) by the total value of shares
continued)
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Shareholders arranged Percentage value of shares
























by Acsending Order of their Percentage Value
of Shares Owned After Privatization (in 1995 CFAF)
Note: TABLE 19 derived from TABLE 18.
(1) is obtained by deviding each shareholder
and TABLE 18 continued by the total value of
continued)
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Shareholders arranged Percentage value of shares







shares value (in TABLE 18,
shares in TABLE 18
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